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Abstrat
This paper analyzes the impliations of bilateral bargaining over wages and employment
between a produer and a union representing a nite number of idential workers in a
monetary maroeonomi model of the ASAD type with government ativity. Wages and
aggregate employment levels are set aording to an eient (Nash) bargaining agreement
while the ommodity market is leared in a ompetitive way. It is shown that, for eah level
of union power, measured by the share it obtains of the total prodution surplus, eient
bargaining implies no eieny loss in prodution. Depending on the level of union power,
temporary equilibria may exhibit voluntary overemployment or underemployment with the
ompetitive equilibrium being a speial ase.
Due to the prie feedbak from the ommodity market and to inome-indued demand
eets, all temporary equilibria with a positive labor share are not Nash bargaining-eient
with respet to the set of feasible temporary equilibrium alloations. While higher union
power indues a larger share of the surplus and a higher real wage, it always implies lower
output and employment. Moreover, the indued nominal equilibrium wage is not always
a monotonially inreasing funtion of union power. Therefore, all temporary equilibria
with eient bargaining are only Seond-best Pareto optimal, i. e. bargaining power and
prodution eieny do not lead to temporary optimality.
The dynami evolution of money balanes, pries, and wages is analyzed being driven
primarily by government budget deits and expetations by onsumers. It is shown that
for eah xed level of union power, the features of the dynamis under perfet foresight
are struturally idential to those of the same eonomy under ompetitive wage and prie
setting. These are: stationary equilibria with perfet foresight do not exist, exept on a
set of parameters of measure zero; balaned paths of monetary expansion or ontration
are the only possibilities induing onstant alloations; for small levels of government
demand, there exist two balaned paths generially, one of whih with high employment
and prodution is always unstable, while the other one may be stable or unstable.
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1 INTRODUCTION 3
1 Introdution
In spite of the fat that in most industrialized ountries negotiations between workers unions
and syndiates of produers about wage levels and employment onditions our regularly, their
eonomi signiane for the labor market or even more for the evolution of the maroeonomy
as a whole is often negleted in the researh on labor markets.
1
Taking the number of artiles
on the subjet in the reent Handbook of Labor Eonomis by Ashenfelter & Card (2011a, b)
relative to other ontributions therein as an indiator, it seems that other theories are onsidered
as more relevant and the motivation to study the impat of bargaining between the two sides on
a partiular market are not at the forefront of the researh in labor eonomis. Among the many
possible maroeonomi models whih determine wage and employment levels, those whih take
a bargaining approah between a produers onglomerate and a workers union are learly in
the minority. This is in ontrast to the general empirial observation that suh negotiations
are observable reurring annual events in most Western eonomies whih indue legally binding
agreements whih are adhered to in these eonomies.
Considering the theoretial models of bargaining between groups (as opposed to other wage-
employment-determining proedures)
2
from a general miroeonomi perspetive, the impor-
tane of strategi aspets in wage and employment negotiations are well reognized and have
been studied extensively. The literature ontains several ontributions applying game-theoreti
notions and onepts (see for example MDonald & Solow 1981; Landmann & Jerger 1999;
Gerber & Upmann 2006). However, most of them ignore ross-market eets and arry out the
analysis in a partial-equilibrium setting. Thus, any spillovers from other markets or from the
inome distribution on the general-equilibrium or maroeonomi level are rarely disussed or
analyzed, whih redues the validity of their results as ontributions to maroeonomis.
One explanation for the lak of more extended game-theoreti onsiderations in maroeonomi
models may lie in the limitations of the game-theoreti approahes and their models themselves.
Two essential aspets may explain this absene:
1. the interation of the labor market with the rest of the eonomy, and
2. the dynami aspet of reurring negotiations, of time, and of unertainty.
With respet to the rst point, the existing theories are built primarily on the ommon priniple
of bargaining as an alloation devie of how to divide a ake of given size. If there were strong
empirial evidene or a onvining theoretial argument that in fat in most market eonomies
the labor market is a suiently independent and isolated unit within the eonomy, whose rules
and alloation priniples have little inuene on the size of the ake, i. e. on GNP, then the
underlying premise of a given onstant ake would be justied, and the distributive aspets
ould be separated from the alloative issues on the national level. However, most eonomists
would agree that there are major alloative mehanisms originating from labor market rules
to the maroeonomi level. Suh spillovers or feedbak eets play a role in determining
the size of GNP. In addition, most game theorists would also agree that many appliations
of bargaining theories assume too naively that the negotiations are direted toward outomes
to be distributed. In most situations, however, bargaining agreements onsist of priniples
or rules in an alloative environment. Outomes are the onsequenes after the behavioral
1
In ontrast, the soial and legal aspets of wage ontrats, of hiring and ring are disussed and analyzed
to a large degree.
2
suh as eieny wages, searh theory, mathing theory, et.
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response of agents aross markets. In other words, outomes result after the feedbaks between
markets take plae and the nal outome like GNP and its distributive parts are endogenously
determined.
3
There are always behavioral responses originating from demand and supply behavior, from
outside options, and in partiular from the feedbak eets from other markets and through
inome eets. Thus, maroeonomi outomes are the result after behavioral onsequenes
in the markets and the spillovers indued, implying that the size of the ake depends on the
rules set in the negotiations. Therefore, muh of standard bargaining theory may not even
be appliable in suh ases or has to be reevaluated. It provides essentially a stati solution
onept and framework for negotiations with no onsideration for interation or feedbak with
an environment or model. Considerations for impliations for outomes after indued hanges
of the environment inluding the feedbak are absent.
For the dynami impliations of repeated negotiations ourring in maroeonomi systems,
game theory again does not provide modeling approahes at a satisfatory level to be applied
suitably to labor markets. The issues to be solved in a setting of repeated negotiations open a
wide range of unsolved problems as to the dynami setting of the negotiation, the negotiators,
the environment, the state variables, and the information, unertainty, and stohasti shoks.
Again, with the ross-market feedbaks playing a qualitative role, the negotiations and their
proedures will have an inuene on the dynami evolution of the eonomy.
The literature on the usage of eient bargaining taking a maroeonomi perspetive is not
sizable.
4
MDonald & Solow (1981) study nonompetitive wage setting in partial equilibrium
models with apaity-onstrained, fully unionized labor markets with one rm and one union.
Inter alia, they analyze the ases of the monopolisti union (with the right to manage of the rm)
as well as two types of eient bargaining over wages and employment using the symmetri
Nash resp. the KalaiSmorodinsky bargaining solutions. The agents' objetive funtions are the
prot of the rm resp. the expeted exess indiret utility of the representative union member.
Indiret utility is measured in nominal wages for a onstant reservation wage.
5
Booth (1996) and Landmann & Jerger (1999) are two prominent presentations addressing and
disussing the eient bargaining solution expliitly in a format whih is the losest to the
one proposed here. Booth (1996) slightly extends the setting by MDonald & Solow (1981) by
applying the generalized Nash bargaining solution while analyzing bargaining over wages alone.
This leaves the employment deision to the rm whih orresponds to the so alled right-to-
manage model. Her modeling generalizes the monopolisti-union model and shows that the
resulting outome is not Pareto eient in a stati partial-equilibrium setting.
Landmann & Jerger (1999) present the eient bargaining model where intertemporal aspets
or money plays no role. They present a partial-equilibrium analysis only by assuming xed
3
There are many examples from empirial agreements whih onrm this fat. For example wage laws
for union members, indexed wages rules, minimum wage laws. Trade agreements among ountries speify
priniples of a free trade: no taris or duties, no disrimination rules, harmonization of taxes, as in the EU.
Finanial/monetary priniples in a monetary union speify a ommon urreny, mutual free exhange, like IMF,
ECB. Cartel agreements speify rules presribing dos and don'ts.
4
We are not aware of any publiations analyzing the role of eient bargaining and spillovers aross markets
nor of the dynamis in a losed maromodel.
5
There are some ontributions dealing with spei dynami or poliy issues within models of apital a-
umulation, as for example Devereux & Lokwood (1991); Kaas & von Thadden (2004); Gerber & Upmann
(2006); Koskela & Puhakka (2006) within nonmonetary models. Gertler & Trigari (2009) presents an interesting
ombination of a market with mathing and staggered Nash bargaining in an empirially oriented model.
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pries throughout with no analysis of the demand side of the eonomy or the eets from the
inome distribution. Moreover, no omparative statis analysis of the role of union power and
their impliations for alloations is performed.
This paper starts from the general premise that there are signiant feedbaks to be studied,
whih are shown to exist in the standard ASAD model of a monetary maroeonomy. It
analyzes the most innouous so-alled eient bargaining solution for the labor market as a
benhmark model, whih assumes the most ooperative struture and solution onept from a
strategi point of view. While the literature agrees that this solution onept is empirially the
most unlikely, its impliations for the maroeonomy must be examined, in partiular whether
it indues the qualitative properties of eieny and optimality whih the literature seems to
assign to it.
The paper derives the struture of the temporary prie feedbak and disusses the full ompar-
ative statis of varying union power, indiating that, in spite of the appliation of the eieny
riterion used in the labor market separately, the eieny riterion as well as Pareto optimality
fails on the marolevel. It ompares the alloative onsequenes with other strategi solutions
of nonooperative behavior of produers and the union. Finally, the dynami onsequenes for
alloations and the stability of the evolution under perfet foresight are investigated.
2 The Labor Market with Eient Bargaining
Consider an eonomy in disrete time with three markets: a labor market, a ommodity market,
and a money market, and three setors: a onsumption setor, a prodution setor, and the
publi setor onsisting of a entral government and a entral bank.
6
2.1 The Publi Setor
The publi setor onsists of a government and a entral bank. The government demands
the produed ommodity at a level g ≥ 0 to produe publi goods and servies. These are
assumed to be pure publi goods providing a onstant level of utility eah period to eah type
of onsumer. In addition, onsumer preferenes are assumed to be additively separable with
respet to the level of the publi good so that these do not indue marginal or behavioral eets
by onsumers. Therefore, the onstant level of publi servies an be and was dropped as an
argument in onsumer utility funtions.
To nane its onsumption (the publi good's prodution) the government levies a proportional
tax on prots at the rate 0 ≤ τπ ≤ 1 and on wages at the rate 0 ≤ τw ≤ 1. Sine the government
parameters are assumed to be given parametrially in eah period, in general, the government
budget is not balaned sine inomes are endogenously determined. Therefore, the entral
bank reates/destroys the amount of money aording to the need of the government arising
from the unbalaned budget. Sine money is the only intertemporal store of value held by
onsumers, any inrease (derease) of the amount of money required to balane the budget of
6
The model hosen is a standard version of an ASAD model based on miroeonomi priniples and em-
bedded in an eonomy with ohorts of overlapping generations of onsumers (see for example Böhm 2010).
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the government is equivalent to the amount of savings (hanges of the amount of money held
by the private setor) in any given period.
7
2.2 The Prodution Setor
The nonstorable ommodity is produed from labor only by a single prot-maximizing rm.
8
The tehnology of the single produing rm is desribed by a dierentiable monotonially
inreasing and onave prodution F : R → R, L 7→ F (L) satisfying F (0) = 0 and the usual
Inada onditions whih implies that the tehnial equipment or the stok of apital is onstant
and does not depreiate.
At a given nominal wage rate w ≥ 0 for labor and a sales prie p ≥ 0 for the ommodity, a
prodution deision L implies urrent prots Π(p, w, L) := pF (L) − wL. All prots are paid
to onsumers, who are the owners or the shareholders of the rm. There is no intertemporal
deision making of the produer with no need to retain prots nor to hold money. Therefore,
the rm's objetive is to maximize prots. Under ompetitive onditions with pries and wages
given, the behavior of the rm in eah period in the two markets indues the usual prot-
maximizing labor demand funtion
h
om
(
w
p
)
:= argmax
L≥0
{pF (L)− wL} = (F ′)
−1
(
w
p
)
(1)
and the ommodity supply funtion F (h
om
(w/p)).
In nonompetitive situations, in partiular under bargaining, pairs (L,w) of employment and
wage levels have to guarantee nonnegative prots Π(p, w, L) ≥ 0 for the produer. Therefore,
the zero-prot ontour implies the partiipation onstraint for the produer
w ≤ p
F (L)
L
=: WΠ(p, L),
whih denes his reservation wage as a funtion of the employment level L > 0.
2.3 The Consumption Setor
The onsumption setor onsists of overlapping generations of two types of homogeneous on-
sumers. There are nw ≥ 1 workers and ns ≥ 1 shareholders in eah generation, both of whih
live for two onseutive periods. The size and omposition of the two groups is onstant through
time implying that at any one time, there are ns + nw young resp. old onsumers.
Eah shareholder onsumer reeives net prots only in the rst period of his life. He spends
the proportion 0 < c(θe) < 1 in the rst period and saves the rest in the form of money to be
spent on onsumption in the seond period. Money is the only intertemporal store of value for
7
To save on notation, we omit, wherever possible, the government parameters g, τw, and τpi in all arguments
throughout this paper. When analyzing behavior and markets in any partiular period, it is always assumed
that money holdings M ≥ 0 and prie expetations pe > 0 are given at the beginning and remain xed during
the period, exept when their omparative statis eets are disussed.
8
This assumption is made for simpliity only, the extension to multiple homogeneous rms organized in a
produers assoiation is straightforward.
Volker Böhm & Oliver Claas Dynamis with Eient Wage Bargaining
2 THE LABOR MARKET WITH EFFICIENT BARGAINING 7
onsumers whih arries no interest. Therefore, his onsumption/savings deision depends on
the expeted rate of ination θe := pe/p.
Eah worker supplies labor in the rst period of his life to onsume in the seond period only. His
preferenes with respet to planned future onsumption ce ≥ 0 and work ℓ ≥ 0 when young are
desribed by an intertemporal utility funtion of the form u(ℓ, ce) = ce−v(ℓ) where the funtion
v : R+ → R+ measures the disutility from labor. The funtion v is assumed to be ontinuously
dierentiable, stritly monotonially inreasing, stritly onvex, with v(0) = v′(0) = 0 and
limℓ→∞ v
′(ℓ) =∞.
Given a wage rate w, an employment level ℓ, and a wage tax τw, he saves his total nominal
net wage inome (1 − τw)wℓ in the form of money, to be spent on onsumption in the seond
period of his life. With given prie expetations pe, his planned future onsumption satises
pece = (1 − τw)wℓ. Therefore, under ompetitive onditions and prie expetations p
e
, his
utility-maximizing labor supply is given by
argmax
ℓ≥0
{
u
(
ℓ, (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ
)}
= (v′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
,
whih is a ontinuous, stritly monotonially inreasing funtion of the expeted future value
of the urrent nominal wage.
Given the worker's prie expetations pe > 0, it is straightforward to dene his reservation
wage for nonompetitive situations. The labor market partiipation onstraint of a worker for
an aeptable employmentwage situation (ℓ, w) must provide a utility at least as high as not
working when young. In other words, (ℓ, w) must be a solution of
u(0, 0) = 0 ≤ u(ℓ, ce) = u
(
ℓ, (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ
)
= (1− τw)
w
pe
ℓ− v(ℓ).
This implies the lower bound of the individually aeptable wage rate, i. e. his reservation wage,
as
w
pe
=
1
1− τw
v(ℓ)
ℓ
, ℓ > 0 (2)
whih is a stritly inreasing funtion of the employment level. >From these properties one
denes diretly the aggregate ompetitive labor supply as
N
om
(
w
pe
)
:= nwℓ = nw(v
′)−1
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)
whih has a global inverse given by
w
pe
= S
om
(L) :=
1
1− τw
v′
(
L
nw
)
.
With equal treatment of workers one obtains the aggregate reservation wage from equation (2)
as
w
pe
= S(L) :=
nw
L(1− τw)
v
(
L
nw
)
,
whih has an elastiity
9
ES(L) = Ev(L/nw)− 1. (3)
9
For any funtion f we denote its elastiity at x as Ef (x). Thus, Ev(L/nw) denotes the elastiity of the
funtion v.
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This implies a useful relationship between the reservation wage and the ompetitive inverse
labor supply funtion
S
om
(L) = Ev(L/nw)S(L) for all L. (4)
Given the harateristis of eah individual young worker, the union is pereived of as an ag-
gregate agent representing the onsumer-workers onsisting of all homogeneous workers. Sine
all workers have idential harateristis, the union's bargaining will be onerned with the
determination of the wage level w and the aggregate level of employment L, assuming that all
workers are treated equally, i. e. eah is paid the wage w with individual employment level L/nw.
2.4 Eient Wage Bargaining and Employment
It is evident that one of the most hallenging questions to investigate onerns the feedbak
eets or spillover eets between the labor market and the output market sine in the losed
maroeonomy the impat from wage negotiations on the inome distribution will have eets
on aggregate demand and therefore on output and inome. Moreover, these eets will depend
on the market struture hosen on either side.
The framework hosen for the wage bargaining between the union representing the onsumer-
workers and the produer as a wage determination devie onsists of an appliation of a bargain-
ing solution to the simultaneous determination of the aggregate employment level L and of the
wage rate w under the assumption that the negotiating parties, the union and the produer, are
both prie takers in the ommodity market. With this hoie it is possible to disuss best the
role of bargaining in general equilibrium and ompare the outomes with the ompetitive ase.
Under eieny onsiderations, hoosing the Nash bargaining solution ould be one possibility
although in the repeated or dynami ontext this may not be the fully onvining.
10
In other
words, the produer and the union treat the ommodity prie as given, impliitly assuming
that their bargaining deision has no inuene on the indued equilibrium prie in the short
run. Thus, a temporary equilibrium with eient wage bargaining is dened by a ompetitive
prie level p whih equalizes aggregate supply and aggregate demand of the ommodity market
at whih the levels of employment and wages indue the desired eient bargaining solution
between the union and the produer.
The result of the bargaining proedure between the union and the produer onsists of a joint
deision with respet to the employment level L and the wage rate w where the produer's
goal is to maximize its net prot while the union tries to maximize the aggregate exess wage
bill for the workers. Let Π(p, w, L) = pF (L) − wL denote the net prot and Ω(pe, w, L) :=
wL−peS(L)L the exess wage bill. Given prie expetations and ommodity prie (pe, p)≫ 0,
a bargaining agreement (L,w) is alled individually rational if Π and Ω are nonnegative. An
eient bargaining agreement between the union and the employer is dened in the usual way.
Denition 2.1 Given (pe, p) ≫ 0, a employmentwage pair (L,w) ∈ R2+ is alled eient if
there exists no other pair (L′, w′) suh that
Π(p, w′, L′) ≥ Π(p, w, L) and Ω(pe, w′, L′) ≥ Ω(pe, w, L)
with at least one strit inequality.
10
From a game-theoreti point of view, the generalized Zeuthen solution for half-spae games an be applied
whih is less spei than Nash; see also the remarks in the introdution and in the onlusion.
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To haraterize eient agreements, one may use the assoiated Lagrangean funtion
Λ(w,L, κ) = Ω(pe, w, L) + κ
(
Π(p, w, L)− Π¯
)
and obtains the rst-order onditions of an interior solution (L,w)≫ 0 as
pF ′(L) = pe(S(L) + S ′(L)L), L > 0. (5)
Any positive solution determines the same level of employment for all levels of net prot Π¯.
Moreover, the solution of (5) is idential with that level of employment whih would lear the
labor market under onditions of perfet ompetition between the union and the produer for
any given pair (pe, p)≫ 0.
This result is well-known from the literature. It ours in situations of bargaining/ooperative
deision making between any two agents who are the only partiipants trading in the same
market, whih orresponds to the situation in a vertially integrated industry, a artel or a
bilateral monopoly. In suh ases, under eieny, the two traders internalize all potential net
gains and they will deide on a level of trade and prie between them whih maximizes the sum
of their net gains. If they are both faing ompetitive markets upstream and downstream, the
resulting level of ativity between them under eieny is idential to that level of trade whih
would result under ompetitive trading, with some mild assumptions. This level guarantees that
there are no further joint gains to share. In other words, the level of trade equalizes marginal ost
to marginal revenue between the two players and maximizes the ake to share. For the model
here between the union and the produer, this implies that the determination of an eient
bargaining solution an be divided into two steps: the hoie of the level of employment whih
depends on the market data upstream and downstream, and the determination of the wage
whih then turns out to beome the entral point in the bargaining proedure of sharing the
net gains.
Wage Bargaining in the Bilateral Monopoly
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, the employment deision under eient bargaining
turns out to be equivalent to the standard textbook representation when the union and the
produer form a bilateral monopoly. For a given prie expetations and ommodity prie
(pe, p)≫ 0, the joint net gain is given by
Π(p, w, L) + Ω(pe, w, L) = pF (L)− wL+ wL− peS(L)L = pF (L)− peS(L)L
is a funtion of the employment level alone. Thus, it is neessary that an optimal employment
deision maximizes pF (L) − peS(L)L, independent of the wage deision to be taken. This
indues the rst-order ondition
pF ′(L) = peS(L)
(
ES(L) + 1
)
(3)
= peS(L)
(
Ev(L/nw)− 1 + 1
)
(4)
= peS
om
(L), (6)
whih oinides with (5). Therefore, the employment deision of a bilateral monopoly max-
imizing joint net gain against the rest of the eonomy oinides with the one under eient
bargaining. Thus, the employment deision to yield the maximal joint net gain an be sepa-
rated from the wage deision of how this gain is to be distributed. In this perspetive, the labor
market has been eliminated, the employment deision L orresponds to an internal deision
of a union-produer monopoly, while the deision for the wage rate beomes a ost alloation
issue.
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This separability of the employment and the wage deision an be portrayed geometrially in
the assoiated employmentwage spae (see Figure 1). For L > 0, an aeptable wage must be
suh that Π ≥ 0 and Ω ≥ 0, i. e.
w ≤ p
F (L)
L
= WΠ(p, L) and w ≥ p
eS(L) =: WΩ(p
e, L),
induing the two status-quo wage funtions WΠ and WΩ whih orrespond to the reservation
wage of the produer and of the union respetively. The area between the two funtions in
Figure 1 denes the set of individually rational employmentwage pairs.
The set of eient employmentwage hoies under bargaining are those on the ontrat urve
shown as the bold red line. Geometrially speaking, eah point on the ontrat urve must
PSfrag replaements
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WΩ
(WΠL)
′
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Figure 1: Determining the level of employment
be a tangeny point of an iso-utility and of an iso-prot urve (the thin lines). Sine all iso-
utility/iso-prot urves are of the form
WΠ¯(L) =
pF (L)− Π¯
L
resp. WΩ¯(L) = p
eS(L) +
Ω¯
L
for all levels Π¯ and Ω¯, the tangeny ondition ∂W (L)/∂L implies
pF ′(L)L−W (L)L
L2
!
= peS ′(L)−
W (L)− peS(L)
L
.
Sine F (L) and −S(L)L are stritly onave funtions satisfying the Inada onditions, the set
of individually rational (L,w) is ompat. Moreover, pF (L) − peS(L)L is a stritly onave
funtion as well. Therefore, the neessary onditions are also suient. Finally, given the
strit onavity of both funtions, the solution L > 0 is unique for any positive given expeted
ination rate θe = pe/p > 0. Thus, the solution of equation (5) denes an employment funtion
h : R++ → R++, θ
e 7→ h(θe). Its inverse is given expliitly by
pe
p
=
F ′(L)
S(L) + S ′(L)L
(6)
=
F ′(L)
S
om
(L)
:= h−1(L), (7)
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whih is dierentiable and stritly dereasing sine (h−1)′(L) < 0 holds. Therefore, under
eient bargaining, the level of employment h(θe) is a well-dened, stritly monotonially
dereasing, and invertible funtion of the expeted ination rate θe. It is homogeneous of
degree zero in prie expetations and pries, it is dereasing in expeted pries and inreasing
in the urrent output prie. In addition, the employment level hosen by the two bargaining
parties is the same as the one whih would result in equilibrium under a perfetly ompetitive
labor market.
Rewriting the ondition (7) using the two reservation wage funtions, one obtains an intuitive
and interesting relationship
WΩ(p
e, L) = peS(L) =
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
pF (L)
L
=
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
WΠ(p, L). (8)
for the relative shares depending on the elastiities of the reservation wage funtions, whih
also haraterizes the bargaining level of employment. This stipulates that the ratio between
the two status-quo values should orrespond to the ratio of their respetive elastiities.
The Wage Rate under Bargaining
Given (pe, p) ≫ 0 and L = h(pe/p) > 0, the bargaining deision between the two parties
onerning the wage rate now onstitutes a bargaining game with onstant transfers sine Π+
Ω = pF (L)−peS(L)L = WΠ(p, L)L−WΩ(p
e, L)L is a onstant sum. Thus, one obtains a speial
ase of a bargaining problem, to whih the generalized Zeuthen solution applies (see Rosenmüller
2000). For suh games the bargaining power between the two parties is usually measured by a
number 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, whih denes the relative share of the total ake to be alloted to the party
having bargaining power λ. Thus, for a onstant total gain Π+Ω = WΠ(p, L)L−WΩ(p
e, L)L,
the weights (λ, 1 − λ) determine a linear redistribution of the total net gain among the two
agents.
Therefore, with L > 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 given, an appliation of the generalized Zeuthen solution11
to the total gain implies hoosing the bargaining wage as a onvex ombination of the two
reservation wage levels WΠ (when Π = 0) and WΩ (when Ω = 0) with the same weights
W (pe, λ, p, L) = λWΠ(p, L) + (1− λ)WΩ(p
e, L), L = h(θe).
(9)
Substituting (9) into the utility and into the prot funtions yields the payo vetor (Π,Ω) of
the bargaining solution(
Π(pe, λ, p, L)
Ω(pe, λ, p, L)
)
=
(
pF (L)−W (pe, λ, p, L)L
W (pe, λ, p, L)L− peS(L)L
)
=
(
WΠ(p, L)L−W (p
e, λ, p, L)L
W (pe, λ, p, L)L−WΩ(p
e, L)L
)
=
(
WΠ(p, L)−WΩ(p
e, L)
)
L
(
1− λ
λ
)
=
(
pF (L)− peS(L)L
)(1− λ
λ
)
.
(10)
For given (pe, p), Figure 2 displays the range of the mapping (10) for dierent values of the
parameter λ, revealing its linear impat on the payo distribution. A similar linear relationship
11
Note that the generalized Zeuthen solution (whih an only be applied to half-spae games) oinides with
the generalized Nash solution, yet requiring less properties.
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Figure 2: The impat of the bargaining power λ on the equilibrium payo
holds for the role of λ on the bargaining wage. Finally, substituting (8) into the bargaining
wage funtion (9), one nds that the equilibrium bargaining wage
W (pe, λ, p, L) =
(
λ+ (1− λ)
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
pF (L)
L
=
(
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
+ λ
ES(L) + 1− EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
pF (L)
L
is a multiple of average produtivity, and that the equilibrium real wage
W (pe, λ, p, L)
p
=
1
EF (L)
(
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
+ λ
ES(L) + 1− EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
F ′(L)
is a positive multiple of the marginal produt of labor (with L = h(pe/p)). Both equations
show learly how the bargaining parameter interats with the elastiities of the two reservation
wage funtions
Relative Union Power
As was seen above, an eient bargaining solution (L,w) = (h(pe/p),W (pe, λ, p, h(pe/p))) is
dened parametrially for a given 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 measuring the bargaining power. Thus, the
model does not provide a fully endogenous determination of the bargaining power between
the union and the produer. However, the eient level of employment is independent of λ,
implying that unionemployer negotiations do guarantee produtive eieny. Therefore, the
bargaining parameter λ determines exlusively the redistribution of revenue between the two
parties, i. e. the share of wages and prots in total revenue.
It is intuitively lear (and also evident from the geometry of Figure 1) that there must be a
unique bargaining level for whih the parties agree on the ompetitive wage. This one equalizes
marginal ost resp. marginal revenue ((WΠL)
′
resp. (WΩL)
′
). Geometrially speaking, this
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orresponds to the wage where the respetive iso-utility and iso-prot urves are horizontal.
Let the unique λ for whih this ondition holds be denoted by λ
nat
, the natural λ. It is the
solution of either
W (pe, λ, p, L)
!
=
∂(WΠ(p, L)L)
∂L
or W (pe, λ, p, L)
!
=
∂(WΩ(p
e, L)L)
∂L
,
where L = h(pe/p). Inserting the denition of W (pe, λ, p, L) into the seond equation gives
λ
nat
WΠ(p, L) + (1− λnat)WΩ(p
e, L) =
∂(WΠ(p, L)L)
∂L
= pF ′(L) = EF (L)WΠ(p, L).
Exploiting (8) then gives
EF (L)WΠ(p, L) = λnatWΠ(p, L) + (1− λnat)WΩ(p
e, L)
= λ
nat
WΠ(p, L) + (1− λnat)
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
WΠ(p, L)
=
(
λ
nat
+ (1− λ
nat
)
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
WΠ(p, L)
=
(
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
+ λ
nat
ES(L) + 1−EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
WΠ(p, L)
whih implies
λ
nat
(L) =
EF (L)ES(L)
ES(L) + 1−EF (L)
. (11)
In other words, λ
nat
(L) is determined by the elastiities ES and EF of the labor supply funtion
and of the prodution funtion respetively. Therefore, with isoelasti funtions λ
nat
(L) is
onstant.
The wage share of total revenue an be omputed in a similar manner.
wL
py
=
W (pe, λ, p, L)
WΠ(p, L)
= λ+ (1− λ)
WΩ(p
e, L)
WΠ(p, L)
(8)
= λ+ (1− λ)
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
=
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
+ λ
(
1−
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
∈
[
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
, 1
]
.
(12)
Therefore, the prot share of total revenue is
π
py
= 1−
wL
py
= (1− λ)
(
1−
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
. (13)
Note that the wage share resp. the prot share for λ
nat
(L) is EF (L) resp. 1−EF (L), as expeted,
sine at λ
nat
(L) the fator shares in total output must be equal to the respetive elastiities of
the prodution funtion F .
Underemployment and Overemployment
Sine the bargaining solution (L,w) = (h(θe),W (pe, λ, p, h(θe))) is a joint agreement between
the two agents, there an neither be any involuntary unemployment nor overemployment. In
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other words, any dierene between L = h(θe) and the desired labor supply N
om
(w/pe) has
to be interpreted as a measure of a voluntary deviation from the ompetitive labor supply
of the workers, whih is a supply side measure. Similarly, any dierene between L and the
desired ompetitive employment h
om
(w/p) by the produer would be a demand side measure
of voluntary deviation relative to the ompetitive regime.
Here, the voluntary underemployment rate will be dened in the usual way as
U = U
(
L,
w
pe
)
:=
N
om
(w/pe)− L
N
om
(w/pe)
= 1−
L
N
om
(w/pe)
, (14)
whih measures the gap between the amount of labor whih is atually traded (i. e. worked)
and whih would be supplied by the workers under ompetitive onditions at the given wage
level. Sine the rate of unemployment is dened for all expeted real wages and all levels of
labor, U dened in (14) an also be negative. This ours for example if w/pe is relatively low
or L is relatively high. We interpret negative rates of underemployment as overemployment (or
overtime).
2.5 Nonompetitive Wage Setting versus Wage Bargaining
It is often onjetured that nonooperative strategi behavior or market power by produers or
by unions ould be a reason why unemployment in labor markets exists. This setion briey
presents the orresponding model with suh one-sided deviant behavior on the wage setting
and its impliation on the level of pries, wages, and on the level of employment
12
at given
ommodity pries. The omparison between the ooperative and nonooperative temporary
equilibria indued for the maroeonomy will be presented in Setion 4.
The Monopsonisti Firm and Union Monopoly
Given (pe, p)≫ 0 and the aggregate labor supply funtion N
om
(w/pe) of workers, the monop-
sonisti rm hoses a wage rate whih maximizes
pF
(
N
om
(
w
pe
))
− wN
om
(
w
pe
)
.
This implies the rst-order ondition for an interior solution
F ′
(
N
om
(
w
pe
))
=
w
p
(
1 +
1
EN
om
(w/pe)
) (
>
w
p
)
.
Let w˜ = W
mon
(pe, p) = pW
mon
(pe/p, 1) denote the unique solution, and let the indued aggregate
employment and aggregate supply be given by
L˜ = h
mon
(
pe
p
)
:= N
om
(
W
mon
(pe/p, 1)
pe/p
)
, AS
mon
(
pe
p
)
:= F
(
h
mon
(
pe
p
))
.
The rst-order ondition implies that for any (pe, p),
h
mon
(
pe
p
)
< h
om
(
pe
p
)
and AS
mon
(
pe
p
)
< AS
om
(
pe
p
)
.
12
see also Böhm (2010)
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Therefore, as a onsequene, at any given (pe, p) ≫ 0, the wage is equal to the marginal
reservation wage of workers whih is smaller than the marginal value produt of labor for the
rm. Thus, the rm reeives a monopsonisti surplus equal to pF ′(L˜) − w˜L˜, see Figure 3(a).
However, at the same time, the wage is larger than the true reservation wage.
PSfrag replaements
0
0 L
w
L∗
w∗
L˜
w˜
peS
om
(L)
pF ′(L)
pF ′(L)
1+ES
om
(L)
om
(a) surplus of the monopsonisti rm
PSfrag replaements
0
0 L
w
L∗
w∗
L˜
w˜
om
pF ′(L)
om
peS
om
(L)
1+EF ′(L)
peS
om
(L)
(b) surplus of the monopolisti union
Figure 3: Wages, employment, and surplus in monopolisti situations; (pe, p) given
Sine the produer aepts the market behavior of the workers as being given by their supply
funtion (whih orresponds to their marginal reservation wage), it seems as if the rm ould
exert more power and higher prots in the omparable bargaining situation by lowering the
wage to the true reservation wage, whih is not an option for the produer to be hosen under
market onditions. In other words, the employmentwage deision diers from the eient
bargaining under the most powerful bargaining situation for any given prie level p, when
λ = 0 .
The situation where a powerful union ontrols the labor market and sets the wage and the
employment level is the symmetri opposite ase to the monopsonisti rm and an be treated in
a similar fashion. Given (pe, p)≫ 0 and the labor demand funtion of the produer h
om
(w/p) =
(F ′)−1(w/p), the monopolisti union hoses a wage rate w whih maximizes
wh
om
(
w
p
)
− peS
(
h
om
(
w
p
))
h
om
(
w
p
)
= wh
om
(
w
p
)
− pe
nw
1− τw
v
(
h
om
(w/p)
nw
)
.
This implies the rst-order ondition
w
pe
(
1
Eh
om
(w/p)
+ 1
)
=
1
1− τw
v′
(
h
om
(w/p)
nw
)
= S
om
(
h
om
(
w
p
))
with the solution w˜ = W
union
(pe, p) = pW
union
(pe/p, 1) whih indues a level of employment and
aggregate supply
L˜ = h
union
(
pe
p
)
:= h
om
(
W
mon
(
pe
p
, 1
))
, AS
union
(
pe
p
)
:= F
(
h
union
(
pe
p
))
.
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For every (pe, p), this indues a wage equal to the marginal value produt whih is, however,
larger than the ompetitive wage and larger than the marginal willingness to work of every
worker at the assoiated level of employment. Thus, the workers obtain an aggregate monopo-
listi surplus equal to pF ′(L˜)− peS
om
(L˜), see Figure 3(b). As in the ase of the monopsonisti
rm, the union aepts the labor demand behavior by the produer as being given. Therefore,
the wage being equal to the marginal reservation wage of the produer is higher than the true
reservation wage, equal to average osts. Thus, at the given prie, the powerful union does not
obtain aess to the full rent from the produer, whih it ould obtain under bargaining and
λ = 1.
Summarizing the main results of this setion, one nds that the employmentwage deision
under one-sided strategi behavior in the labor market implies that the powerful side of the
market ollets an extra rent by exploiting the weaker trader, as is to be expeted. Moreover,
this indues an ineient employment alloation sine the marginal willingness to work never
equals the marginal willingness to hire sine only one side of the market is a prie taker while the
other one is not. This implies a lower level of employment than in the ompetitive situation at
all given pries and prie expetations, whih is in ontrast to the eient bargaining solution.
However, the strategi behavior does not generate unemployment.
13
3 Temporary Equilibrium with Eient Wage Bargaining
It is now straightforward to lose the model in order to determine the properties of a temporary
equilibrium under wage bargaining. The data at the beginning of an arbitrary period are
aggregate money balanes M > 0 held by old onsumers, expeted pries for the future period
pe > 0, and the bargaining parameter 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, plus the parameters of the government
(g, τw, τπ). Then, a temporary equilibrium with eient wage bargaining is dened by a pair of
pries and wages (p, w)≫ 0 suh that the prie p lears the ommodity market ompetitively
while the wage w equals the one set by the union and the produer in the bargaining solution.
Assoiated with the equilibrium is the equilibrium alloation whih onsists of a pair of feasible
employment and output levels (L, y) = (L, F (L))≫ 0.
Sine all agents in the eonomy  onsumers, the produer, and the government  are assumed
to be prie takers in the ommodity market, nding a temporary equilibrium is equivalent to
nding a prie p whih equalizes aggregate demand and aggregate supply, where aggregate
demand has to be appropriately adjusted to the inome distribution indued by the bargaining
result.
3.1 The Role of Union Power in Temporary Equilibrium
Aggregate Supply and Aggregate Demand
The bargaining wage W (pe, λ, p, L) and the assoiated employment level L = h(pe/p) were
derived as a funtion of prie expetations and pries in the previous setion where the employ-
ment deision turned out to be independent of the bargaining parameter λ. Therefore, given a
13
for a more detailed disussion see Setion 4
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pair of prie expetations and pries (pe, p) ≫ 0, the aggregate ommodity supply funtion is
dened by
AS : R++ → R++, AS(θ
e) := F (h(θe)).
This is a funtion of the expeted ination rate alone, whih is globally invertible and dier-
entiable. Sine h′(θe) < 0, one nds that AS ′(θe) < 0 so that, for any given prie expetation
pe > 0, aggregate supply is a stritly inreasing funtion of temporary ommodity pries
dAS(pe/p)
d p
> 0.
In ontrast, the bargaining wage W (pe, λ, p, h(pe/p)) will have an inuene on the inome
distribution and thus on aggregate demand. Sine there are four dierent private onsumers
plus the government generating aggregate demand, the inome distribution between prots and
wage inome and the total inome generated determine aggregate demand.
The assumptions onerning the overlapping-generations struture of onsumers imply that all
urrent net wages are saved and a proportion 0 ≤ c(θe) ≤ 1 of urrent net prots is onsumed
by young shareholders. Therefore, aggregate real demand in any period is the sum of total real
money balanes m := M/p, government demand g, plus the demand by shareholders whih is a
funtion of aggregate prots. Thus, given money balanes, prie expetations, the bargaining
weight, and pries (M, pe, λ, p), the inome onsistent aggregate demand y must be the solution
of
y = m+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ)
π
p
(13)
= m+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1−
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
y
with y = F (L) and L = h(θe). Therefore, one obtains as the inome-onsistent aggregate
demand funtion
y = D(m, θe, λ) =
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
EF (L)
ES(L)+1
)
=
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
EF (h(θe))
ES(h(θe))+1
)
,
(15)
whih is of the usual multiplier form with respet to money balanes and government demand.
Observe that aggregate demand is homogeneous of degree zero in (M, pe, p). Therefore, for
given λ, it is a funtion of real money balanes and of the expeted rate of ination. Obviously,
∂D/∂m > 0, i. e. real balanes have a positive eet on demand, and ∂D/∂λ < 0, i. e. higher
bargaining power by the union dereases prots and thus onsumption demand by shareholders.
In addition, if ∂D/∂θe ≥ 0, then the demand is stritly dereasing in the ommodity prie p,
i. e. dD(M/p, θe, λ)/d p < 0 is negative. This property holds in partiular when the savings
proportion by shareholders is nondereasing and when the reservation wage and the prodution
funtion are isoelasti.
Therefore, given a bargaining weight 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and any pair (M, pe)≫ 0 of money balanes and
prie expetations, the temporary equilibrium is given by a prie p whih lears the ommodity
market, i. e.
D
(
M
p
,
pe
p
, λ
)
= AS
(
pe
p
)
. (16)
Conerning existene and uniqueness, one has the following immediate result.
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Lemma 3.1 Let the aggregate supply funtion AS be globally invertible with AS ′(θe) < 0, and
assume that ∂D/∂θe ≥ 0, ∂D/∂m > 0 hold. Then, for every (M, pe)≫ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, there
exists a unique positive temporary equilibrium prie p > 0 solving equation (16).
The uniqueness follows from the fat that the exess demand funtion is stritly monotoni-
ally dereasing. Figure 4 portrays the equilibrium situation in the usual aggregate demand
aggregate supply diagram of the ommodity market. As a onsequene of Lemma 3.1, one
PSfrag replaements
0
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y
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(
pe
p
)
D
(
M
p
, p
e
p
, λ
)
Figure 4: The temporary equilibrium prie
obtains the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 There exist dierentiable mappings P : R2++ × [0, 1]→ R++ and W : R
2
++ ×
[0, 1]→ R++, alled the prie law and the wage law respetively, suh that
• the unique positive temporary equilibrium prie is given by
p = P(M, pe, λ), (17)
• the unique positive temporary equilibrium wage is dened by
w =W(M, pe, λ) := W
(
pe, λ,P(M, pe, λ), h
(
pe
P(M, pe, λ)
))
,
and
• P and W are homogeneous of degree one in (M, pe), for given λ.
Properties of the Prie Law
Applying the impliit funtion theorem to (16) with respet to M , one obtains the eet of an
inrease of money balanes
∂P
∂M
=
1
P
∂D
∂m
− p
e
P2
F ′h′ + M
P2
∂D
∂m
+ p
e
P2
∂D
∂θe
> 0
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Figure 5: Comparative-statis eets of money balanes and prie expetations
with an elastiity
0 < EP(M) =
∂P
∂M
M
P
=
M
P
∂D
∂m
−p
e
P
F ′h′ + M
P
∂D
∂m
+ p
e
P
∂D
∂θe
< 1. (18)
Thus, the temporary equilibrium prie is a stritly inreasing and stritly onave funtion of
money balanes sine pries are nonnegative. Applying the impliit funtion theorem to (16)
one more, one obtains a positive expetations eet on pries
∂P
∂pe
= −
1
P
F ′h′
− p
e
P2
F ′h′ + M
P2
∂D
∂m
+ p
e
P2
∂D
∂θe
> 0
with an elastiity
EP(p
e) =
∂P
∂pe
pe
P
=
− p
e
P2
F ′h′
− p
e
P2
F ′h′ + M
P2
∂D
∂m
+ p
e
P2
∂D
∂θe
< 1, (19)
whih is also less than one, implying that equilibrium pries are a stritly inreasing and
stritly onave funtion in prie expetations. Together this implies that the prie law P is
stritly onave and homogeneous of degree one in (M, pe), with a representation of the form
p = peP(M/pe, 1, λ) whih is stritly inreasing and stritly onave in M/pe.
Output and Employment
Given the prie law, one obtains the assoiated temporary equilibrium alloation onsisting of
the levels of output and employment as funtions of the same data (M, pe, λ), i. e.
y = Y(M, pe, λ) := F
(
h
(
pe
P(M, pe, λ)
))
and
L = L(M, pe, λ) := h
(
pe
P(M, pe, λ)
)
.
(20)
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whih are homogeneous of degree zero in (M, pe). Using (18) and 0 < EF (L) < 1, one obtains
the orresponding elastiities of money balanes on employment and output as
EL(M) = −Eh(θ
e)EP(M) > 0 and EL(M) > EF (L)EL(M) = EY(M) > 0. (21)
Thus, higher money balanes imply higher equilibrium pries but also higher levels of employ-
ment and output.
Similarly, applying property (19), 0 < EF (L) < 1, and the relationship
EL(p
e) = Eh(θ
e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1−EP(p
e))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
< 0 (22)
yields
EL(p
e) < EF (L)EL(p
e) = EY(p
e) < 0.
Thus, output and employment deline with higher prie expetations. Therefore, ombined
with the zero-homogeneity of the employment law and output law, this onrms the tradeo
between money balanes and expetations for a onstant level of output and employment.
Figure 5 displays the omparative statis results for hanges of prie expetations and of real
money balanes.
Properties of the Wage Law
In ontrast to the above results, the omparative statis eets of the wage law annot be signed
in general sine several diverse eets interat in a nonlinear way. This an be seen partially
from the form of the wage law equation
w =W(M, pe, λ) = λWΠ
(
P(M, pe, λ),L(M, pe, λ)
)
+ (1− λ)WΩ
(
pe,L(M, pe, λ)
)
,
(23)
whih shows an interation of the eets of the prie law and the employment law in the
denition. However, it is possible in some speial situations to determine the eets under
more restrited onditions. Writing the wage as the assoiated mark-up over the reservation
wage of the workers (or equivalently as a mark-down from the reservation wage of the produer)
w =
(
1 + λ
ES(L(M, p
e, λ)) + 1− EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
EF (L(M, pe, λ))
)
WΩ(p
e,L(M, pe, λ)) (24)
=
(
λ+ (1− λ)
EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
)
WΠ(P(M, p
e, λ),L(M, pe, λ)),
one observes that the state variables exert their inuene on wages via a primary eet through
the prie and employment laws and a seondary eet through the respetive elastiities, whih
determine the mark-up. Therefore, in situations where the eet of the state variable on the
mark-up is small and an be negleted, the wage eet has the same sign as the employment
eet, i. e.
sgnEW(M) = sgnES(L)EL(M) > 0
sgnEW(p
e) = sgn (EP(p
e)− (1− EF (L))EL(p
e)) > 0
(25)
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In this ase, wages inrease with money balanes and with prie expetations. This indiates,
however, that wages an also fall when employment inreases.
The eet of the state variables on the real wage an be determined using the same proedure.
Writing the real wage as
w
p
=
(
λ+ (1− λ)
EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
)
F (L(M, pe, λ))
L(M, pe, λ)
=
(
λ+ (1− λ)
EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
)
F ′(L(M, pe, λ))
EF (L(M, pe, λ))
=
(
λ
EF (L(M, pe, λ))
+
1− λ
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
)
F ′(L(M, pe, λ)),
(26)
one nds that it an be written as a positive multiple of average labor produtivity or of the
marginal produt of labor respetively. Therefore, for given λ, due to the onavity of the
prodution funtion with average produtivity delining in L, output and employment always
move in the opposite diretion as the real wage with respet to the state variables (M, pe),
provided that the elastiities do not hange too muh. Setion 4 ontains a detailed analysis of
the wage law for a spei parametri example.
The Role of Union Power
Sine the parameter λ does not inuene aggregate supply, the assumption ∂D/∂θe ≥ 0 implies
that
sgn
∂P
∂λ
= sgn
∂D
∂λ
< 0.
Therefore, an inrease of union power has a negative eet on the temporary equilibrium prie,
i. e. the elastiity with respet to union power EP(λ) < 0 is negative. Therefore, an inrease in
union power indues a redution of pries, output, and employment. Using the properties of
the employment law (20) one has
EL(λ) = −Eh(θ
e)EP(λ) < 0 EL(λ) < EF (L)EL(λ) = EY(λ) < 0. (27)
Figure 6 portrays the eets of hanges of union power on equilibrium pries, showing that
there exists a strong nonlinear feedbak from the bargaining power on the equilibrium pries,
output, and employment. Thus, while the wage bargaining proedure assumes prie-taking
behavior on behalf of both parties induing a pereived wage inrease under inreased union
power, the level λ of union power has a negative indiret or spillover eet on the equilibrium
prie whih operates through a negative inome eet on aggregate demand.
The bargaining power λ enters in multiple but opposite ways into the wage equation (23),
similar to money balanes and prie expetations (M, pe). This implies that, in general, the
overall eet of union power on the equilibrium wage annot be signed. However, the eet of
λ on the real wage an be determined using the same tehnique as above. Rewriting the real
wage equation (26) as
w
p
=
(
EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
+ λ
(
1−
EF (L(M, p
e, λ))
ES(L(M, pe, λ)) + 1
))
F (L(M, pe, λ))
L(M, pe, λ)
,
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Figure 6: Range of equilibrium pries P(M, pe, λ) for λ from 0 to 1
one nds that it must inrease with union power whenever the wage is noninreasing or when
the eet of λ on the elastiities an be negleted. Setion 4 also ontains a detailed study of
the role of union power for a parametrized version of the model.
3.2 Comparing Bargaining and Competition
The results in the previous setion indiate that the level of pries, output, and employment
vary inversely with union power λ. It is somewhat surprising that suh fairly strong omparative
statis properties hold in general. With suh lear negative inuene on output and employment
from powerful but eient wage bargaining, it is partiularly desirable to investigate the role
of bargaining in its general relationship to ompetitive alloations.
To arry out a systemati omparison between temporary equilibria under ompetition and
under eient wage bargaining, the impat of bargaining on aggregate demand and aggregate
supply relative to the ompetitive ase has to be examined. Given the labor demand funtion
of the ompetitive produer (see equation (1)) h
om
(w/p) = (F ′)−1(w/p), the labor market
learing ondition
N
om
(
w
p
/pe
p
)
= h
om
(
w
p
)
implies the usual equilibrium relationship between expeted ination and the real wage
pe
p
= θe =
w/p
N−1
om
(h
om
(w/p))
=
w/p
S
om
(h
om
(w/p))
=: W−1
om
(
w
p
)
.
Using equation (6) with L = h(θe), this indues
W−1
om
(
h−1
om
(L)
)
=
h−1
om
(L)
S
om
(h
om
(h−1
om
(L)))
=
F ′(L)
S
om
(L)
(7)
= θe.
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Therefore, for all pe/p = θe,
h
om
(W
om
(θe)) = h(θe),
(28)
the equilibrium employment deisions in the labor market under bargaining and under ompe-
tition are idential. This in turn implies that the two aggregate supply funtions are the same,
i. e. for all θe,
AS
om
(θe) = F (h
om
(W
om
(θe))) = F (h(θe)) = AS(θe).
To dene inome-onsistent aggregate demand under ompetition, let pries and wages (p, w)
be given. The ompetitive rm hooses its labor input aording to the marginal produt rule
w = pF ′(L), implying that the prot share of total revenue is
py − wL
py
= 1−
F ′(L)L
F (L)
= 1− EF (L).
Thus, inome-onsistent aggregate demand in the ompetitive ase must satisfy
y = m+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ) (1−EF (L)) y,
leading to the aggregate demand funtion under perfet ompetition in the labor market
y = D
om
(m, θe) =
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− EF (L))
, L = h
om
(W
om
(θe))
(28)
= h(θe),
as ompared to the aggregate demand funtion under bargaining derived from
y = m+ g + c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1−
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
)
y
in (15) as
y = D(m, θe, λ) =
m+ g
1− c(θe)(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
EF (L)
ES(L)+1
)
, L = h(θe).
Thus, the two aggregate demand funtions dier essentially only by the size of the multiplier,
whih depends on λ and on the values of the respetive elastiities. Therefore, one nds that,
for all (M, p, pe), aggregate demand under bargaining is stritly dereasing in λ with
D(m, θe, 1) < D
om
(m, θe) < D(m, θe, 0)
and, sine aggregate supply is independent of λ and idential in the two ases, that
P(M, pe, 1) < P
om
(M, pe) < P(M, pe, 0).
As a onsequene, for given (M, pe), by the ontinuity and monotoniity of the prie law under
bargaining as a funtion of λ, there must exist a unique value 0 < λ
om
< 1, where the
temporary equilibrium prie at the bargaining equilibrium oinides with that of the ompetitive
equilibrium, i. e. one has
P
om
(M, pe) = P(M, pe, λ
om
).
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Thus, given the equivalene P
om
(M, pe) = p = P(M, pe, λ
om
) of the equilibrium prie un-
der ompetition and under bargaining for λ
om
, aggregate supply and aggregate demand at
equilibrium must be the same
D
om
(M/p, pe/p) = AS
om
(pe/p) = AS(pe/p) = D(M/p, pe/p, λ
om
)
so that the level of output, employment, and of wages
Y
om
(M, pe) = D
om
(
M
p
,
pe
p
)
= D
(
M
p
,
pe
p
, λ
om
)
= Y(M, pe, λ
om
),
L
om
(M, pe) = F−1
(
D
om
(
M
p
,
pe
p
))
= F−1
(
D
(
M
p
,
pe
p
)
, λ
om
)
= L(M, pe, λ
om
), and
W
om
(M, pe) =W(M, pe, λ
om
)
are equalized as well. Therefore, the ompetitive temporary equilibrium is a speial ase of the
possible equilibria under eient bargaining for a spei value λ
om
of union power.
While the oinidene of the two equilibria does not seem surprising at rst sight, one should
note that this results depends ruially on the fat that the reservation wages for workers and for
the rm are dened by the zero-ativity level of workers and produers and by the fat that they
are ommon knowledge in the bargaining proedure. These assumptions imply a symmetri no-
partiipation onstraint (or threat point) for both sides whih indues the spei equilibrium
harateristis with no loss in prodution-eort eieny, equalizing the real marginal produt
to the ompetitive marginal willingness to work. Thus the employment hoie orresponds to
the ompetitive one, making the aggregate supply funtion under bargaining equivalent to the
ompetitive one. Thus, the bargaining equilibrium not only provides an eient redistribution
of value added, but it also eliminates inter-party ineienies leading to an optimal tradeo
between marginal disutility of eort and marginal produtivity of labor. In this sense, the
temporary equilibrium with bargaining satises onditional Pareto optimality at any level λ > 0
of bargaining power. Yet, the total value added ould always be improved by setting λ = 0.
Combined with a lump-sum redistribution of the surplus, a Pareto improvement ould be
obtained.
14
If, however, the reservation wages of either side had been hosen to be the levels of the or-
responding ompetitive inverse demand or supply funtions, i. e. their marginal willingness to
work or hire at given pries and prie expetations, onditional Pareto optimality ould not
be obtained under bargaining sine total net value would not have been maximized in equi-
librium. In suh ases, the bargaining equilibrium would generate alloations with pries and
wages, levels of employment and output whih are ontinuous deformations between the two
ases of one-sided full market power for the union, i. e. the union monopoly, and the produer
monopsony, whih were disussed in Setion 2. As was shown there, these would suer from
additional ineienies and the ompetitive temporary equilibrium ould not be ahieved as
an equilibrium under eient bargaining.
14
Note that this disussion argues only about eieny in terms of the payo between the rm and the
union and not in welfare terms with respet to the two groups of onsumers and their indiret utility. A
welfare omparison should use their utility funtions. In this ase, the eets stemming from underemploy-
ment/overemployment would have to be aounted for as well. Moreover, the intertemporal struture of over-
lapping generations requires additional riteria between old and young onsumers and their position in the
temporary equilibrium, for whih a Pareto riterion is not universally dened.
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3.3 Ineient Redistribution under Eient Wage Bargaining
The negative feedbak of union power on pries, output, and employment derived in (27)
indiates that, from a maroeonomi point of view, a strong union under eient bargaining
may not guarantee an overall eient alloation in temporary equilibrium. In other words,
given the data of the eonomy (M, pe, λ), output is maximal when λ = 0 and minimal when
λ = 1. This suggests that the bargaining proedure will never attain the global maximal surplus
in the eonomy unless λ = 0.
To investigate the role of the bargaining power more losely, onsider the payo vetor (Π,Ω)
in temporary equilibrium, whih is obtained by substituting the prie law P(M, pe, λ) from (17)
and the wage law from (20) into the payo vetor (10). This yields(
Π(M, pe, λ)
Ω(M, pe, λ)
)
=
(
WΠ(P(M, p
e, λ),L(M, pe, λ))−WΩ(p
e,L(M, pe, λ)
)
L(M, pe, λ)
(
1− λ
λ
)
=
(
P(M, pe, λ)F (L(M, pe, λ))− peS(L(M, pe, λ))L(M, pe, λ)
)(1− λ
λ
)
.
Thus, the eient bargaining solution at the temporary equilibrium is a linear one-to-one
redistribution of the total net surplus
Π(M, pe, λ) + Ω(M, pe, λ) = P(M, pe, λ)F (L(M, pe, λ))− peS(L(M, pe, λ))L(M, pe, λ),
(29)
implying a marginal rate of substitution between Π(M, pe, λ) and Ω(M, pe, λ) equal to minus
one. Taking the derivative of (29) with respet to λ, one nds that
d
dλ
(
Π(M, pe, λ) + Ω(M, pe, λ)
)
=
d
dλ
(
P(M, pe, λ)F (L(M, pe, λ))− peS(L(M, pe, λ))L(M, pe, λ)
)
=F (L(M, pe, λ))
∂P(M, pe, λ)
∂λ
+
d
dL
(
pF (L)− peS(L)L
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
=0
∂L(M, pe, λ)
∂λ
=F (L(M, pe, λ))
∂P(M, pe, λ)
∂λ
< 0
(30)
has a negative sign. Therefore, higher union power λ also indues a lower aggregate equilibrium
surplus. Thus, the aggregate surplus is a stritly dereasing funtion with a global maximum
at λ = 0. Geometrially speaking, this implies that the bargaining possibility frontier for all
0 < λ ≤ 1 in temporary equilibrium is stritly below the minus one tradeo line at Π(M, pe, 0)−
Ω(M, pe, 0).
It is obvious that the prot term of the payo Π(M, pe, λ)−Ω(M, pe, λ) is dereasing in λ while
the inuene on the wage bill annot be signed in all ases. In fat, it may be inreasing or
dereasing depending on the data. Figure 7 displays the payo frontier in equilibrium for two
dierent levels of government onsumption, taking the feedbak into aount. Both panels show
that the distribution of wealth is not linear in λ. While the equilibrium prot always dereases
with union power, the right panel learly shows that even the wage bill may be delining with
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Figure 7: Net wage bill and prot with prie feedbak
union power in some irumstanes. Figure 8 ombines Figure 2 and Figure 7 displaying the
equilibrium payos for four levels of union power (λ = 0.00, λ = 0.33, λ = 0.67, and λ = 1.00)
as intersetions of the sharing ratios λ/(1−λ) and the orresponding assoiated linear tradeo
frontier (thin downward-sloping lines with pries assumed to be xed at the respetive levels).
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Figure 8: The role of money balanes for λ = 0.00, λ = 0.33, λ = 0.67, and λ = 1.00
Finally, the two properties of delining aggregate surplus (30) and the linearity of the payos
for given λ imply that the bargaining solution is ineient at the equilibrium prie for all λ > 0.
This follows diretly from the fat that the slope of the bargaining frontier must be smaller than
one in absolute value at any λ. The argument is given geometrially in Figure 8 and Figure 9.
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Figure 9: No eient Nash bargaining solution under prie feedbak: the better set (red)
The bargaining frontier is given by the bold downward-sloping urve. To provide the intuition
for this result, it is useful to reonsider the bargaining problem. Sine both groups are prie
takers in the ommodity market, they assume that its prie is given and unaeted by their
wage setting for given λ. Thus, the negotiating parties have a pereived payo frontier with
slope minus one while the slope of the bargaining frontier is less in absolute value. In addition
to the frontier shown in Figure 8, Figure 9 ontains the level urve of the Nash bargaining
solution, whih must have slope minus one at the equilibrium payo. Sine the slope of the
bargaining frontier is atter, there exists a lower λ and a redistribution at the equilibrium prie
p = P(M, pe, λ) whih improves the Nash produt. The possibility of suh improvements is
indiated geometrially by the red regions, the feasible upper ontour set.
3.4 Summary
For a general disussion of the role of bargaining as a wage determination devie, one should
note rst that temporary equilibria with eient bargaining exist and they are unique under
the same set of assumptions as in other ases of wage setting with prie exibility and market
learing. Thus, temporary equilibria exist so that eient wage bargaining by itself annot be
the ause for involuntary unemployment.
>From a maroeonomi point of view, however, the most striking result is that higher union
power direted toward a desired and suessful redistribution from prots to wages in temporary
equilibrium always auses lower employment and lower output. This universal negative impat
of union power on employment and total output has additional alloative onsequenes. With
onstant exogenous demand (government demand plus money balanes), an inrease of union
power implies lower prots and lower eetive demand by young shareholders. Prodution
beomes less attrative to produers even if the inome distribution (i. e. the prot share in
output) stays onstant, but the multiplier dereases. In other words, aggregate output to be
distributed for private and publi onsumption delines with higher union power.
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Therefore, if total output or aggregate private onsumption in temporary equilibrium is onsid-
ered as a welfare proxy, it would not be desirable to have a strong union imposing a high level of
λ. However, the redistribution due to a higher wage bill implies higher savings and demand for
money by workers induing higher expeted onsumption in the seond period. Thus, higher
union power also indues an inrease of real wealth for workers and higher expeted indiret
utility. Thus, young shareholders partly pay the bill of high union power through redued
onsumption in both periods. Nevertheless, this inrease always inurs a maroeonomi ost
of lower total.
Finally, it was shown that an eient bargaining proedure between the partiipants in the
labor market alone does not lead to an eient outome with respet to the objetive of the
bargaining when the remaining market is ompetitive. Generally speaking, this reonrms
the typial features of results known from Seond-best Theory, whih say that nonompetitive
or deviant behavior in one market alone while all others are ompetitive does not guarantee
Seond-best alloations if there are spillovers between markets. Notie that this result equally
applies to the ompetitive temporary equilibrium. In other words, even the fully ompetitive
temporary equilibrium is not eient with respet to the bargaining riterion, due to the prie
feedbak. Thus, the exogenous parametri setting of the negotiating power of one side of the
market indues only an eient alloation with respet to the pereived feasible bargaining set,
and whih is ineient with respet to general equilibrium feasibility. Thus, an eient level
of bargaining power would have to be determined endogenously.
>From a general welfare perspetive, however, it is not lear whether this ineieny implies
also suboptimality and failure to satisfy a Seond-best property sine both riteria are applied to
a omparative-statis analysis of alloations in temporary equilibrium at given money balanes
and expetations. Therefore, for the dynami maroeonomi perspetive taken here with
overlapping generations of onsumers, the Seond-best failure may not seem to be of suh
primary importane. Moreover, the welfare issue beomes even more omplex for sequenes
of temporary equilibria and requires further riteria and investigations, also with respet to
stationary states. What they imply for the dynami development will be analyzed partly
in Setion 5. Moreover, arguments will be disussed whih would justify an intertemporal
adjustment of union power and its onsequenes, invalidating many arguments of the stati
omparisons with onstant union power.
4 A Parametri Example: the Isoelasti Case
Some further qualitative and quantitative properties of the bargaining model an be obtained
when the funtional forms of both groups of agents are isoelasti. These features will also
prove useful in Setion 5 where the dynami behavior of the model will be disussed. Let the
shareholder's utility be given by log c0+δ log c
e
with δ > 0, whih implies a onstant propensity
c ≡ 1
δ+1
to onsume out of net prots whih is independent of prie expetations.
Next, assume that the disutility of eort of the young worker is given by
v(ℓ) =
C
C + 1
ℓ1+
1
C , 0 < C < 1,
and let the isoelasti prodution funtion be of the form
F (L) =
A
B
LB, A > 0, 0 < B < 1.
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Solving the young worker's rst-order ondition of optimality (1 − τw)
w
pe
= ℓ1/C yields the
individual utility-maximizing labor supply as
ℓ =
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)C
,
implying an isoelasti ompetitive aggregate labor supply funtion
N
om
(
w
pe
)
= nw
(
(1− τw)
w
pe
)C
.
Its inverse is given by
S
om
(L) =
1
1− τw
(
1
nw
L
)1/C
.
This is a stritly onvex isoelasti funtion measuring the aggregate marginal willingness to
work at the aggregate level L when nw homogeneous workers are employed equally. This is the
inverse of the ompetitive aggregate labor supply funtion.
The individual reservation wage of eah worker is the solution of
w
pe
=
1
1− τw
v(ℓ)
ℓ
=
1
1− τw
C
C + 1
ℓ1/C .
Thus, the maximal amount of labor eah worker is willing to supply at a given wage w is given
by
ℓ =
(
(1− τw)
C + 1
C
w
pe
)C
. (31)
Therefore, the aggregate reservation wage funtion of the union is given by
S(L) =
C
C + 1
1
1− τw
(
1
nw
L
)1/C
,
whih has the same onstant elastiity as the aggregate marginal willingness to work of the
union. Therefore, one nds that
S(L) =
C
C + 1
S
om
(L) and N
(
w
pe
)
=
(
C + 1
C
)C
N
om
(
w
pe
)
.
The funtions S and S
om
have the same elastiity 1/C, whih oinides with the elastiity of
the individual marginal willingness to work, while N and N
om
have the same elastiity C.
The inverse of the demand for labor (7) an be omputed expliitly
θe = h−1(L) =
EF (L)
ES(L) + 1
F (L)
S(L)L
=
BC
C + 1
F (L)
S(L)L
= A(1− τw)n
1/C
w L
BC−(C+1)
C .
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This yields the labor demand funtion under bargaining as
L = h(θe) =
(
θe
A(1− τw)n
1/C
w
) C
BC−(C+1)
(32)
= A
C
C+1−BC (1− τw)
C
C+1−BC n
1
C+1−BC
w (θ
e)
C
BC−(C+1) , (33)
whih has a onstant elastiity satisfying
−C < Eh(θ
e) =
C
BC − (C + 1)
= −
C
C(1− B) + 1
< 0. (34)
Therefore, aggregate labor demand under bargaining is an isoelasti, stritly monotonially
dereasing funtion in expeted ination. For a given pe > 0, it is also isoelasti, stritly
monotonially inreasing, and onave in the prie. Substituting labor demand (32) into the
prodution funtion implies a stritly dereasing isoelasti aggregate supply funtion in expeted
ination given by
AS(θe) =
1
B
A
C+1
C+1−BC (1− τw)
BC
C+1−BC n
B
C+1−BC
w (θ
e)
BC
BC−(C+1) , (35)
making it an isoelasti, stritly inreasing, and stritly onave funtion of the ommodity prie
p for any given prie expetation pe.
Regarding the inome distribution, equation (13) implies that, for any given union power 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1, the prot share in output is a given onstant
π
py
= (1− λ)
(
1−
BC
C + 1
)
. (36)
Thus, with isoelasti prodution and preferenes, the prot share under eient bargaining
beomes a linear, dereasing funtion in λ, independent of the expeted ination rate.
The two properties, an isoelasti utility of shareholders together with an ination-independent
prot distribution (36), imply that there is no ination feedbak into aggregate ommodity
demand under bargaining. Thus, one obtains from (15) as the inome-onsistent aggregate
demand funtion
D(m, λ) =
m+ g
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)
, (37)
whih is stritly dereasing in λ and independent of expeted pries. Equating aggregate
demand (37) and aggregate supply (35), one obtains a unique positive equilibrium prie p =
P(M, pe, λ) where the prie map P has the usual properties, i. e. it is inreasing and linear
homogeneous in (M, pe). Due to the isoelastiity of aggregate supply given in (35), its inverse
with respet to prie expetations Pe is given expliitly by
pe = Pe(p,M, λ) := pAS−1
(
D(M/p, λ)
)
= pAS−1(1)
(
M/p+ g
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)
)BC−(C+1)
BC
,
(38)
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whih is one-to-one, stritly inreasing, and stritly onvex in p. Notie that the inverse of
the prie law is an isoelasti funtion in (M/p + g), whih beomes an isoelasti funtion in p
only when exogenous government demand g is equal to zero. Thus, the prie law itself is an
isoelasti funtion in M/pe only when g = 0.
In addition to the bounds derived in the general setting of Setion 3, one obtains upper and
lower bounds for the respetive elastiities of the employment funtion using the isoelastiity
of the labor supply funtion (34).
0 < EL(M)
(21)
= −Eh(θ
e)EP(M) =
C
C(1− B) + 1
EP(M) < EP(M),
−C < EL(p
e)
(22)
= Eh(θ
e) (1−EP(p
e)) = −
C
C(1 −B) + 1
(1−EP(p
e)) < 0,
0 > EL(λ)
(27)
= −Eh(θ
e)EP(λ) =
C
C(1− B) + 1
EP(λ) > EP(λ).
(39)
Sine the output funtion Y(M, pe, λ) = F (L(M, pe, λ)) is simply the omposition of the pro-
dution funtion with the employment funtion, its elastiities are the same expressions as in
(39) eah multiplied by B, the elastiity of the prodution funtion F . Observe again that all
equilibrium maps will be isoelasti funtions only if government demand g is equal to zero.
Lower bounds for EW(M) and EW(p
e) have been found in (25). In order to establish upper
bounds, note that the wage law an be written as a multiple, whih neither depends on M
nor pe, of the workers' reservation wage using the onstant elastiities of prodution and labor
supply. From (24) one has
W(M, pe, λ) =
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
)
WΩ(p
e,L(M, pe, λ)) (40)
whih, using (39) and again (34), implies both
0 < EW(M) = ES(L)EL(M) =
EP(M)
C(1−B) + 1
< EP(M) < 1
and
0 < EW(p
e) = 1− ES(L)EL(p
e) = 1−
1− EP(p
e)
C(1− B) + 1
< 1.
Therefore, we an onlude that the wage elastiity with respet to money balanes and prie
expetations are positive and less than unit-elasti.
4.1 The Role of Union Power
While union power determines uniquely the relative share λ/(1− λ) of labor inome to prots
as a monotonially inreasing funtion in λ, its impat on the other employmentwage related
equilibrium values is not neessarily monotoni due to the prie feedbak. For the wage law
W(M, pe, λ) = W (pe, λ,P(M, pe, λ),L(M, pe, λ)) ,
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one nds from (26) that the nominal wage is proportional to the rm's average nominal labor
produtivity,
W(M, pe, λ) =
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
C + 1−BC
C + 1
)
pF (L)
L
. (41)
While the term in parenthesis is monotonially inreasing in λ and independent of the state vari-
ables (M, pe), the nominal labor produtivity itself with p = P(M, pe, λ) and L = L(M, pe, λ)
is not neessarily inreasing in λ. Therefore, due to the prie feedbak, the nominal wage is
not neessarily an inreasing funtion in union power λ. However, from the above equation it
follows that the equilibrium real wage
α =
w
p
=
W(M, pe, λ)
P(M, pe, λ)
=
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
C + 1− BC
C + 1
)
1
B
F ′(L(M, pe, λ))
is a onstant multiple of the marginal produt of labor, where the onstant is an inreasing
linear funtion of λ and independent of demand parameters. Thus, in the isoelasti ase,
the parameter λ determines the mark-up of the real wage over the marginal produt of labor,
whih is independent of the state variables M and pe and of all sal and demand parameters.
Nevertheless, the latter do aet the temporary equilibrium pries and wages as well as the
alloation.
Conerning the nominal payo, an inrease in union power always inreases the payo of the
union while dereasing the rm's prot, as shown in Figure 10. There the ranges of the rm's
prots, the union's utilities, and the total wage bill (both in nominal and in real terms) are
depited as funtions of union power. Notie that the share in total output Π/py is linear in λ
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Figure 10: Range of prots, utilities, and wage bill for λ from 0 to 1
while the real prot Π/p is not (panel (b)).
Finally, the rate of underemployment an be alulated expliitly using the wage law and the
prie law. Beause of
w
pe
(24)
=
(
1 + λ
C(1− B) + 1
BC
)
S(L) =
(
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
C
C + 1
S
om
(L), (42)
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the rate of underemployment an be simplied sine N and S are isoelasti. This implies
U(M, pe, λ) = U
(
L,
w
pe
)
= 1−
L
N
om
(w/pe)
= 1−
((
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
C
C + 1
)−C
L
N
om
(S
om
(L))
= 1−
((
1 + λ
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
C
C + 1
)−C
.
(43)
Thus, with isoelasti prodution and utility funtions, the equilibrium rate of underemployment
is a onstant determined by union power and by labor market parameters, i.e. by supply side
fators only. It is totally independent of the state of the eonomy (M, pe) and of sal and
demand parameters. It is an inreasing funtion of union power. Therefore, high λ imply
positive voluntary underemployment and low imply negative voluntary underemployment. Its
range is given by the interval [
1−
(
C + 1
C
)C
, 1− BC
]
.
In addition, one obtains that for the bargaining weight
λ
nat
≡
B
C(1−B) + 1
,
for whih the ompetitive equilibrium is obtained, as the zero of (43), i. e.
U(M, pe, λ
nat
) = 1−
((
1 +
B
C(1− B) + 1
C(1−B) + 1
BC
)
C
C + 1
)−C
= 0.
Thus, λ
om
≡ λ
nat
is independent of the state (M, pe) and of all demand parameters.
Figure 11 portrays the inuene of union power on output, pries, and wages for the isoelasti
ase. Panel (a) depits the equilibrium situation as the intersetion of aggregate demand and
aggregate supply, exploiting the fat that the union power has no eet on the aggregate supply
urve. Thus, provided that there is no additional expetations feedbak in aggregate demand,
the inuene of higher λ on the temporary equilibrium operates exlusively through the inome
distribution whih auses a negative (downward) shift of the aggregate demand funtion (see
equation (37)). This indues lower pries whih then lead to lower employment and lower
output.
4.2 Union Power and Wages
To analyze the impat of union power on the nominal wage is more involved than the previous
omparisons sine, even with isoelasti funtions, the wage is not always monotonially inreas-
ing in λ. The values of the parameters given in Table 1 were hosen as a benhmark. They
are used in Figures 11 and 12(a) for whih the wage rate is inreasing in λ. The right panel of
Figure 11 shows the range of the equilibrium prie and of the bargaining wage (the red urve)
in temporary equilibrium for λ between zero and one, for values of the parameters where wages
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Figure 11: Output, pries, and wages for λ from zero to one
A B C τπ = τw λ M g p
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Table 1: Standard parameterization
are monotonially inreasing. The diagram has been augmented by the graphs of two funtions
(the blak urves) whih represent the market learing onditions under bargaining for the la-
bor market and the ommodity market separately, eah parametrized by the ommodity prie
p. To derive their properties, onsider rst the wage equation (41) in the isoelasti ase with
employment onsisteny (labor market equilibrium) only, i. e. with L = h(θe). For given pe,
this implies the bargaining wage
LE(p, λ) :=
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
C + 1−BC
C + 1
)
pF (h(θe))
h(θe)
, (44)
for eah ommodity prie, whih is taken as given by workers as well as by the produer. The
properties of F and h imply that the funtion LE is stritly inreasing and stritly onave in
p. In addition, sine h is independent of λ, the employment-onsistent bargaining wage LE is
stritly inreasing in λ as well.
Similarly, for ommodity-market onsisteny, F (L) = D(M/p, λ) must hold. Therefore, insert-
ing the aggregate demand funtion for the isoelasti ase from (37), one obtains an indued
priewage relation under ommodity market equilibrium
CE(p, λ) :=
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
C + 1− BC
C + 1
)
pD(M/p, λ)
F−1(D(M/p, λ))
. (45)
With isoelasti funtions of onsumers and the produer, one nds that the funtion CE is
inreasing and onvex in p and it is also inreasing in λ. Clearly, the intersetion of the graphs
of the two funtions LE and CE denes the temporary equilibrium pair (p, w), whih follows
also from the equality of aggregate supply and aggregate demand
AS(θe) = F (h(θe)) = D(M/p, λ),
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Figure 12: The role of government demand on pries and wages for λ from zero to one
whih is equivalent to equating (44) and (45). As shown above, λ shifts both wage funtions
upward always dereasing the equilibrium prie. However, the impat of union power on the
equilibrium bargaining wage may still be ambiguous, depending on whether the demand eet
dominates the supply eet. Nevertheless, the assoiated real wage must always be inreasing
in λ.
Figure 11(b) portrays a situation of a negatively-sloped priewage urve, implying a monotoni
inrease in nominal wages as λ hanges from zero to one. However, there are situations where
the equilibrium bargaining wage is not always monotonially inreasing in union power λ.
Figure 12 displays the eet of union power for two dierent levels of money balanes with
isoelasti funtions and given eleastiities. For high levels of money balanes (left panel), the
wage is globally inreasing whereas for low levels, the wage is inreasing initially reahing a
maximum for some ritial level 0 < λ < 1 and then delines with further inreases of union
power (right panel). The reason for the reverse eet, arises from the fat that the elastiity
of the prie law annot be onstant as long as government demand is positive and that it is
a funtion of money balanes. Thus, the level of money balanes and of government demand
ould be potential reasons for the deline in wages.
In order to understand this eet, we investigate the elastiity of the prie law and its impat
on the wage law. If one omputes the elastiity of the wage law (40) with respet to union
power
EW(λ) =
(C + 1− BC)λ
(C + 1− BC)λ+BC︸ ︷︷ ︸
from the mark-up
+
EP(λ)
C(1−B) + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
from WΩ
,
one obtains two distint eets. The parameter λ aets the workers' reservation wage neg-
atively, but it aets the saling fator positively. For wages to derease in union power, the
latter needs to be outbalaned by the reservation wage eet. Let us rst show that this annot
our when government demand is equal to zero. Using the expliit form of the inverse of the
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prie law (38), one also obtains an expliit form of the inverse with respet to λ given by
λ = Λ(M, pe, p) :=
1
c˜
((
pe
A˜
)B˜
M/p+ g
pB˜
− (1− c˜)
)
(46)
with
A˜ = AS−1(1), B˜ :=
BC
C + 1−BC
, and c˜ := c(1− τπ)
(
1−
BC
C + 1
)
.
The funtion Λ is stritly dereasing in p with elastiity greater than minus one. Therefore,
|EP(M, p
e, λ, )| = |1/EΛ(M,P(M, p
e, λ))| > 1 in general.
For g = 0, one obtains from (46)
EΛ(λ) = −(1 + B˜)
Mp−(1+B˜)
Mp−(1+B˜) − (1− c˜)(A˜/pe)B˜
.
Solving for Mp−(1+B˜) from (46) and substituting implies
EΛ(λ) = −(1 + B˜)
1− c˜ + λc˜
λc˜
and
EP(λ) = −
λc˜
(1 + B˜)(1− c˜+ λc˜)
.
Thus, EP(λ) is monotonially dereasing in λ with EP(0) = 0 and
−1 < EP(1) = −
c˜
(1 + B˜)
< EP(0) = 0. (47)
Therefore, the wage elastiity is positive for all (M, pe, λ). Moreover,
EW(λ) =
λ(C(1− B) + 1)
BC + λ(C(1− B) + 1)
+
EP(λ)
C(1− B) + 1
=
λ(C(1− B) + 1)
BC + λ(C(1− B) + 1)
−
1
C + 1− BC
λc˜
(1 + B˜)(1− c˜+ λc˜)
.
is the dierene of two onave and inreasing funtions in λ with EW(0) = 0 and
EW(1) =
C(1− B) + 1
C + 1
− c(1− τπ)
C + 1− BC
(C + 1)2
> 0.
Thus, by ontinuity, the wage elastiity is also positive for large λ and for all g > 0 small.
With this information, we are now able to identify situations numerially were a higher gov-
ernment demand g may lead to a negative elastiity of wages with respet to union power.
The properties shown are qualitatively idential in a large neighborhood of the benhmark val-
ues. However, for large government demand, one obtains a negative wage eet as displayed
in Figure 12(b). The reason for this eet lies primarily in the impat of g on the elastiity of
the aggregate demand funtion. For g > 0, one nds that it is an inreasing funtion whih
beomes less elasti for higher pries suh that
−1 < ED(p) := −ED(M/p) = −
∂D(M/p, λ)
∂(M/p)
M/p
D(M/p, λ)
= −
M/p
M/p+ g
< 0.
It seems that this inrease of the prie elastiity together with the hange of the inome distri-
bution as λ inreases eventually indues the reversal eet for the wage law.
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4.3 Comparing Wages, Pries, and Payos
The previous setion analyzed the alloation and prie eets of union power under ooperative
bargaining. It was shown that the ompetitive equilibrium orresponds to a partiular value of
union power for all states and demand situations. It is an interesting and hallenging exerise
to arry out an additional omparison of the outomes under bargaining with those of the
two other basi nonooperative equilibria, whih are often onsidered in the literature when
one-sided wage setting power is disussed for the labor market. These are the situation of a
monopolisti union and of a monopsonisti prodution syndiate or rm, assuming that in all
ases the ommodity market is leared ompetitively and the government behaves identially,
taking full aount of the general-equilibrium eets of pries and inomes.
Comparing the priewage pair of a bargaining solution (for a given λ) with the priewage pairs
of the two monopolisti ases (see Setion 2.5) and the ompetitive outome will yield dierent
answers depending on the given level λ of the bargaining power. Thus, while the priewage
situations for the ompetitive as well as for the monopolisti situations are uniquely deter-
mined, their relative positions to a temporary equilibrium under bargaining will depend on the
bargaining power. Therefore, it may be interesting to ompare the situation of a strong union
under bargaining haraterized by λ = 1 with the nonooperative situation of the monopolisti
union. On the other hand, the priewage situations and alloations of the nonooperative
equilibrium with a monopsonisti rm may be ompared with those resulting under bargaining
indued by a weak union under bargaining given by λ = 0.
In order to understand the inuene of the prie feedbak, whih operates in all four ases, it
is useful to onstrut the set of feasible (individually rational) bargaining agreements between
the union and the produer inluding the prie feedbak. Let (L,w) ≫ 0 denote an arbitrary
bargaining agreement. Given the restrition of nonnegativity of the payos, (L,w) is alled
individually rational for a given prie p if
Π(p, w, L) = pF (L)− wL ≥ 0 and Ω(pe, w, L) = wL− peS(L)L ≥ 0.
An agreement (L,w) is alled inome/demand-onsistent at p if
pF (L) = M + pg + c(1− τπ)(pF (L)− wL) (48)
whih imposes a restrition on feasibility and on the equilibrium prie p. Nonnegativity of prot
implies that feasible employment levels have to satisfy F (L) − g ≥ 0. Given the form of the
aggregate demand funtion (48), one an solve for the assoiated equilibrium prie expliitly to
obtain
p(L,w) :=
M − c(1− τπ)wL
F (L) (1− c(1− τπ))− g
, L 6= L
rit
:= F−1
(
g
1− c(1− τπ)
)
whih must be positive for any (L,w)≫ 0. This implies
Π(p(L,w), w, L) =p(L,w)F (L)− wL =
M − c(1− τπ)wL
F (L) (1− c(1− τπ))− g
F (L)− wL
=
MF (L)− wL(F (L)− g)
F (L) (1− c(1− τπ))− g
.
(49)
The prot funtion (49) is ontinuous exept at the ritial level L
rit
, where the denominator
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Figure 13: Employmentwage pairs under individual rationality and feasibility
of the prie funtion is zero and hanges sign, and where the prie and prot beome in-
nite. Thus, the set of bargaining pairs (L,w) with positive prot onsists of the union of two
disjoint open regions allowing unbounded wages for L < L
rit
and unbounded employment
levels.
15
As a onsequene one nds that the set of individually rational and inome/demand-
onsistent employmentwage pairs takes the form of a union of two adjoining sets as depited
in Figure 13. Observe that the two ritial employment levels, whih are the same for eah
state of the eonomy (M, pe), are determined by demand features and the prodution funtion.
They are independent of money balanes. However, high prie expetations may make the
lower ompat urvilinear triangle empty, implying that all equilibrium alloations must be
in the upper region of feasibility. Sine unbounded wages with unbounded pries are feasible
inome/demand-onsistent equilibrium alloations for employment levels near the upper ritial
level, the assoiated set of payos must be unbounded and be equal to all of R
2
+.
By adding the equilibrium points and the λ-eieny frontier to the above diagrams, one
obtains in Figure 14 a omparison of all senarios in alloation spae and in payo spae. For
the isoelasti example, all equilibria are in the ompat triangular region of the employment
wage spae. This shows also that the two one-sided strategi monopolisti situations indue
ineient employment levels below the eieny frontier (left panel of Figure 14). In ontrast,
the omparison in payo spae onrms the loation of the two one-sided monopolisti equilibria
above the λ-bargaining frontier, see Figure 14(b). In other words, both monopolisti equilibria
indue better payos whih annot be reahed or supported by the ooperative deisions under
eient bargaining. Notie, however, that the union's payo for λ = 1 is less than at the
nonooperative equilibrium while the produer's prot is higher at the nonooperative situation
than under bargaining with λ = 0. However, these relative positions of the payos depend on the
prie expetations. As Figure 15 shows, the payos in both nonooperative equilibria are higher
than the maximal payos under bargaining when expeted pries are high enough. The loation
in payo spae is surprising and ounterintuitive at rst. The arguments disussed at the end
of the two monopolisti ases show that, for eah given prie level p in the nonooperative
15
Stritly speaking, the set also ontains the boundary point (L
rit
, w
rit
) sine there exists an unbounded
interval of positive pries whih indue positive prots.
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Figure 14: Wages, employment, and payos under low prie expetations
situation, the monopolist an exert market power to obtain the full rent from the ompetitive
agent, a possibility whih neither the union nor the produer an obtain under bargaining.
Thus, the prie feedbak seems to wash out this eet under ooperation.
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Figure 15: Wages, employment, and payos under high prie expetations
The diagrams are drawn for the parameters of Table 1 and given values of the government
parameters and for given values of the state variables money balanes and expetations. Beause
of ontinuity, these features are loally robust properties and they will be observed for this
isoelasti lass of models in dierent magnitudes and possibly also in dierent relative orders
under dierent parameters and values of the state variables. However, as some numerial
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experiments have shown, the basi features are preserved for a wide range of values of the
parameters and of state variables. The overall homogeneity of the prie law and the wage law
does not prelude reversals or opposite eets.
While these result might seem to be ounterintuitive at rst sight, it is straightforward to
disern the two prinipal reasons why these eets our. First of all, the maximization of
nominal objetives (prot resp. exess wages) reates spillovers between markets even for stati
general-equilibrium systems, whih are primarily due to inome eets. Beause of these inome
eets, it is unlikely that the universal omparative-statis results (as often derived in partial-
equilibrium models with strategi behavior) will persist in general-equilibrium models. It is
known from general equilibrium theory that suh eets are due to prie normalization, implying
dierent real alloations, relative pries, and nominal values of inomes (prots and wages)
under dierent hoies of a numeraire or of prie indexes. These results are well doumented and
have been reognized in many dierent ontexts in partiular in welfare eonomis, international
trade, or oligopoly theory whenever inome feedbaks are taken into aount appropriately
with a nononstant marginal utility of inome for onsumers.
16
In temporary equilibrium of a
monetary eonomy, these eets learly do not disappear.
Seond, the prie feedbak, whih was shown to be responsible for the ineieny of the bar-
gaining solution under ompetitive prie taking in temporary monetary equilibrium, operates
in eah of the three ases endogenously in a dierent way. There is no strutural feature of
the model whih relates the nominal payos, hosen for the bargaining problem neither to the
nominal objetives by the monopolist/monopsonist with wage setting and prie taking nor to
the results indued by the maximization under ompetitive prie and wage taking. Thus, in
all three ases, the prie feedbak and the inome feedbaks have a deisive inuene on the
nominal values hosen for the payos in the monetary eonomy. For these reasons, the four
labor market senarios whose equilibrium harateristis are ompared in the priewage spae
and in payo spae are in general not omparable with respet to real alloations or nominal
payos, even under the weak onept of eieny. Sine, in addition, equilibrium pries and
alloations depend on the other state variables, an extensive welfare analysis may not lead to
onlusive results.
It is worth noting that some properties of the results are spei to the isoelasti model ho-
sen for the numerial analysis sine the bargaining parameter λ plays a spei dual role in
temporary equilibrium. On the one hand, there is no impat of union power on aggregate
supply. Therefore, the interation of the isoelasti struture between prodution and labor
supply shows that the measure of union power λ exerts a diret inuene on the real wage
mark-up and on the level of underemployment, making both of them onstant in temporary
equilibrium. These onstants depend on the elastiities of the labor market partiipants and on
union power only. Thus, in a dynami eonomy as analyzed in the next setion, both of them
are onstant over time, i. e. independent of (M, pe), and they are independent of all sal and
demand parameters in the eonomy. On the other hand, a powerful union whih an hoose
the parameter λ does not exert absolute ontrol over its seemingly most important endogenous
variable the wage rate. Moreover, even for the isoelasti ase, it seems unlear whether the
wage outome under bargaining dominates the ompetitive outome, in some other sense than
the eieny riterion used above. It remains an open question to what extent the ineienies
will hange or disappear if the bargaining agents hose real rather than nominal payos as
objetives.
16
see for example Dierker & Grodal (1986); Böhm (1994); Gaube (1997); Roberts & Sonnenshein (1976)
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5 Dynamis of Monetary Equilibrium
So far the harateristis of equilibria under bargaining were disussed for an arbitrary given
period t with initial money balanes Mt held by the private setor, expeted pries for the
next period by onsumers pet,t+1, and by the union power λt. Thus, the triple (Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λt)
desribes the state of the eonomy at any given time. Assoiated with eah state are the pries
and wages and the levels of output and employment (pt, wt, yt, Lt) in temporary equilibrium
whih are dened by applying the respetive mappings from the previous setion.
17
This setion analyzes the dynami behavior of the eonomy in equilibrium assuming that union
power is onstant over time and given exogenously at some level 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Sine λ/(1 − λ)
determines the relative share of wages over prots, no other eonomi variables related to
the objetives of the agents are onsidered. As was shown in the previous setion, λ has a
signiant impat on most important eonomi variables in every period, like output, inomes,
pries, and onsumption, whih are relevant for welfare. Thus, it would be desirable to relate
the spei value hosen for union power to the market data whih are indued and to reevaluate
the equilibrium outome with respet to the true objetives of the agents. This leads to an
endogenous determination of the measure of bargaining power. For the dynamis, this implies
that an adaptive rule or a dynami mehanism has to be dened based on the data in eah
period. However, at this stage we examine the dynamis of the monetary eonomy without
providing any justiation what level of union power λ would be reasonable to be assumed,
leaving suh questions to be addressed in future researh. Therefore, the dynami development
of the eonomy will be desribed ompletely by haraterizing the evolution of the two state
variables money balanes and expeted pries (Mt, p
e
t,t+1), implying a two-dimensional state
spae X := R2++.
5.1 Perfet Foresight
A sequene {pet,t+1, pt}
∞
t=t0
of pries and expetations will be said to have the perfet-foresight
property if pet,t+1 = pt+1 holds for all t. It is one of the main questions of dynami maroeonomi
analysis to nd onditions and dene the onepts whih ensure that perfet-foresight sequenes
are in fat generated by an assoiated dynamial system whih is globally dened. In other
words, a foreasting rule or a preditor has to be dened to ensure perfet foresight along any
orbit.
18
In order to guarantee that, for any period t, the atual prie pt oinides with its
assoiated predition pet−1,t, the ondition
pet−1,t = P(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
must hold for any t. This denes impliitly the funtional relationship determining how the
foreast in any period for the next one should be hosen as a funtion of the previous foreast.
Therefore, solving (16) for the expeted prie
pet,t+1 = ψ
∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ) ≡ P
e
(
Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ
)
:= pet−1,tAS
−1
(
D
(
Mt
pet−1,t
, λ
))
17
We will assume throughout this setion that the aggregate demand funtion is independent of expeted
ination. The general ase ould be dealt with easily using the result of Lemma 3.1.
18
see Böhm (2010)
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denes the perfet preditor ψ∗(Mt, ·, λ) sine for all (Mt, p
e, λ)
P(Mt,P
e(Mt, p
e, λ), λ) = id (Mt,λ)(p
e).
Therefore, the two mappings
Mt+1 =M(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ) := Mt + pt (g − τ˜D (Mt/pt, λ))
pet,t+1 =ψ
∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ)
(50)
with pt = P(Mt, ψ
∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ), λ) and
τ˜ ≡ τ˜
(
pet,t+1
pt
, λ
)
= τ˜
(
ψ∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ)
P(Mt, ψ∗(Mt, p
e
t−1,t, λ), λ)
, λ
)
dene the dynami behavior of money balanes and expetations under perfet foresight for any
level of bargaining power λ. In addition, τ˜ denotes the average tax rate whih will be derived
in (52). Sine for all t, one has pet−1,t = pt, one an rewrite (50) as
Mt+1 =M(Mt, pt, λ) =Mt + pt (g − τ˜D (Mt/pt, λ))
pt+1 = ψ
∗(Mt, pt, λ) =ptAS
−1
(
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))
,
(51)
dening equivalent dynamis with perfet foresight in the spae of money balanes and pries
(M, p) for any given level λ of bargaining power.
It is one of the reurring themes of dynamial eonomies with prie expetations that in most
ases prie dynamis indued under perfet foresight are unstable, a phenomenon whih also
ours in the urrent model. To see this, let M¯ > 0 denote an arbitrary onstant level of money
balanes and λ be given. Then, (51) redues to the one-dimensional dynamial system in pries
G : R++ → R++,
pt+1 = ψ
∗
(
M¯, pt, λ
)
=: G (pt) .
Rewriting (16) one nds that it has the unique positive xed point
p =
M¯
D−1 (AS(θe);λ)
=
M¯
D−1 (AS(1);λ)
,
where D−1 is the inverse of the aggregate demand funtion with respet to its rst argument
M/p. Sine the prie law is invertible with respet to prie expetations with an elastiity
stritly between 0 and 1 implies that the unique positive xed point p is asymptotially unstable
sine
G ′(p) =
∂ψ∗
∂pe
(M¯, p, λ) =
∂Pe
∂p
(
M¯, p, λ
)
=
1
∂P
∂pe
(M¯, ψ∗(M¯, p, λ), λ)
>
ψ∗(M¯, p, λ)
P(M¯, ψ∗(M¯, p, λ), λ)
= 1.
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5.2 Dynamis of Money Balanes and Pries
One of the main reasons for the prie feedbak ourring under bargaining originates from the
impat of the bargaining power on the inome distribution whih in turns inuenes aggregate
demand. This has a major inuene on the dynamis of savings and money balanes whih
needs to be analyzed in detail to justify the formula suggested in (51) for the demand multiplier.
The aggregate nominal net inome of young onsumers in any period t is given by
(1− τw)wtLt + (1− τπ)πt.
Sine market learing implies that the amount of inome spent on onsumption by the young
has to be equal to the amount not spent by the old and by the government, it follows that
onsumption expenditures by the young are equal to c(1 − τπ)πt = pt(yt − g) −Mt. Hene,
young onsumers save
Mt+1 = (1− τw)wtLt + (1− c)(1− τπ)πt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
= Mt + ptyt
(
(1− τw)
wtLt
ptyt
+ (1− τπ)
πt
ptyt
)
+ pt(g − yt)
= Mt − ptyt
(
1− (1− τw)
wtLt
ptyt
− (1− τπ)
πt
ptyt
)
+ ptg.
Replaing the wage and the prot share by the elastiities (12) and (13), respetively, and
writingB := EF (h(θ
e
t,t+1)) and C := 1/ES(h(θ
e
t,t+1)) for short yields that this term only depends
on the expeted rate of ination θet,t+1 and on union power λ,
1− (1− τw)
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
(
1−
BC
C + 1
))
− (1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1−
BC
C + 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:τ˜(θet,t+1,λ)
,
whih always is between 0 and 1. Therefore aggregate savings are given by
Mt+1 = Mt − τ˜
(
θet,t+1, λ
)
ptyt + ptg = Mt + pt
(
g − τ˜
(
θet,t+1, λ
)
yt
)
= Mt + P(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
(
g − τ˜
(
pet,t+1
P(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
, λ
)
Y(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
)
=:M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
dening the time-one map of money balanes. The funtion τ˜ (θet,t+1, λ) ollets all terms whih
inuene the inome distribution. It represents the average tax rate on aggregate inome, whih
an be rewritten as
τ˜(θet,t+1, λ) = 1− (1− τw)
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
(
1−
BC
C + 1
))
+ (1− τπ)(1− λ)
(
1−
BC
C + 1
)
=
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
(
1−
BC
C + 1
))
τw + (1− λ)
(
1−
BC
C + 1
)
τπ
= τπ +
(
BC
C + 1
+ λ
(
1−
BC
C + 1
))
(τw − τπ),
(52)
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whih shows that it is a onstant depending on the parameters of the eonomy but not on
expeted ination. Sine the oeients of τw and τπ add up to unity, τ˜ is a onvex ombination
of the dierent tax rates. If a ommon tax rate τ is imposed on all types of inome, τ˜ (θet,t+1, λ) =
τ and Mt+1 = Mt + pt(g − τyt) hold. This implies that union power only aets the short-run
tax return if dierent tax rates are imposed.
Substituting Mt+1 =M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ) into ψ
∗
(
Mt+1, p
e
t,t+1, λ
)
gives a perfet preditor depend-
ing on the urrent state only. Therefore the two-dimensional dynamis induing perfet foresight
are (
Mt+1
pet+1,t+2
)
=
(
M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
ψ∗
(
M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ), p
e
t,t+1, λ
)) . (53)
5.3 Steady States and Stability
Exploiting the perfet-foresight property(
M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
ψ∗
(
M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ), p
e
t,t+1, λ
)
)
=

Mt + P(Mt, pet,t+1, λ)
(
g − τ˜
(
pet,t+1
P(Mt,pet,t+1,λ)
, λ
)
D
(
Mt
P(Mt,pet,t+1,λ)
, λ
))
pet,t+1AS
−1
(
D
(
M(Mt,pet,t+1,λ)
pet,t+1
, λ
))


=

Mt + pt
(
g − τ˜
(
ψ∗(Mt,pt,λ)
pt
, λ
)
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))
pt+1AS
−1
(
D
(
Mt+1
pt+1
, λ
))


and bakdating the seond equation gives
(
Mt+1
pt+1
)
=

Mt + pt
(
g − τ˜
(
ψ∗(Mt,pt,λ)
pt
, λ
)
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))
ptAS
−1
(
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))


(54)
whih is an equivalent formulation of the system (53).
Let (M, p) ∈ R2+ be a steady state, for whih the two onditions g = τ˜(1, λ)D(M/p, λ) and
1 = AS−1 (D(M/p, λ)) must hold simultaneously. If (M, p) ≫ 0, monotoniity, homogeneity,
and ontinuity of aggregate demand in (M, p) imply that there exists a ontinuum of xed
points sine for all γ > 0, the (γM, γp) are xed points as well. Geometrially speaking this
implies that the set of positive steady states onsists of a half-line in the state spae R
2
+ with
slope m = M/p. However, this ondition an hold only when AS(1) = g/τ˜(1, λ). Thus, in the
spae of parameters of the eonomy, positive perfet-foresight steady states with a balaned
government budget do not exist generially.
To analyze the loal stability of any of these xed points, one obtains as the Jaobian of the
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system
19
J =
(
1− τ˜ (1, λ)D′(m) τ˜ (1, λ)D′(m)m
D′(m)
AS′(1)
1− D
′(m)
AS′(1)
m
)
=
(
1− τ˜ (1, λ)ED(m)
AS(1)
m
τ˜(1, λ)ED(m)AS(1)
ED(m)
EAS(1)
1
m
1− ED(m)
EAS(1)
)
.
The trae and the determinant of J are
trJ = 2− τ˜ (1, λ)ED(m)
AS(1)
m
−
ED(m)
EAS(1)
and
det J =
(
1− τ˜(1, λ)ED(m)
AS(1)
m
)(
1−
ED(m)
EAS(1)
)
−
ED(m)
EAS(1)
τ˜ (1, λ)ED(m)
AS(1)
m
= 1−
ED(m)
EAS(1)
− τ˜(1, λ)ED(m)
AS(1)
m
= trJ − 1.
The eigenvalues ν1 and ν2 are the roots of the harateristi equation ν
2 − (trJ)ν + det J , i. e.
ν1,2 =
trJ ±
√
(trJ)2 − 4 det J
2
=
trJ ±
√
(trJ)2 − 4tr J + 4
2
=
trJ ±
√
(trJ − 2)2
2
=
trJ ± (trJ − 2)
2
.
Thus, one obtains
ν1 = tr J − 1 = det J and ν2 = 1.
Sine
ν1 = tr J − 1 = 1−
τ˜ (1, λ)AS(1)
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=g/m
ED(m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=m/(m+g)
−
ED(m)
EAS(1)
=
m
m+ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
−
ED(m)
EAS(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0,
both eigenvalues are nonnegative, whih exludes the possibility of yles. To establish an
upper bound, note that
ν1 = ED(m)
(
1−
1
EAS(1)
)
=
m
m+ g
(
1−
BC − (C + 1)
BC
)
=
m
m+ g
C + 1
BC
≤
C + 1
BC
,
19
For simpliity, only the ase of no ination feedbak on the average tax rate is onsidered. This is the ase
for the isoelasti example (Setion 4) or under one ommon tax rate. To improve readability, D(M/p, λ) is
replaed by D(m). Thus, D′ may be written instead of ∂D/∂m.
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whih is less than unity if both B and C are not too small. More preisely, beause of
m+ g = (1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
))AS(1) and g = τ˜(1, λ)AS(1),20
ν1 =
1− τ˜(1, λ)− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)
C + 1
BC
.
Consider the ase that B → 0 or C → 0. Then BC/(C + 1)→ 0 so that the rst fration
m
m+ g
→
1− λτw − (1− λ)τπ − c(1− τπ)(1− λ)
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)
=
(1− c)(1− τπ)(1− λ) + λ(1− τw)
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)
is nitely bounded, whereas the seond fration tends to innity, whih implies that ν1 tends
to innity. Therefore, depending on the parameters of the eonomy one may nd onvergene
to any xed point (M, p)≫ 0 or divergene.
Note that eonomially meaningful values for C are in the range (0, 1), so (C + 1)/(BC) must
be greater than 2. In order to ompensate this fator in ν1, the publi onsumption g must
outbalane m, whih oinides with high tax rates, in partiular a high wage tax.
PSfrag replaements
0
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Figure 16: Convergene to ontinuum of stationary states
Figure 16 displays the situation with a ontinuum of stationary states under the parameteri-
zation given in Table 2. The green half-line is the set of steady states of (54) while the red
half-line orresponds to an unstable balaned path (see the next setion below). A numerial
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A B C g τw τπ λ c nw
1.00 0.95 0.95 τ˜ (1, λ)AS(1) 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.99 1
Table 2: Parameterization used in Figure 16.
simulation for the isoelasti ase analyzed in Setion 4 shows that all orbits starting within the
basin of attration (the area to the lower right of the red line) onverge to a positive point
on the green line, whereas all paths originating in the triangle to the upper left of the red
line onverge to zero with pries slower than money balanes implying inreasing real money
balanes with unbounded growth of output and employment.
5.4 Dynamis of Real Money Balanes under Perfet Foresight
Now onsider the generi ase with AS(1) 6= g/τ˜(1, λ). Sine xed points of (53) do not exist,
the eonomially interesting situations are those when money and pries expand or ontrat at
the same rate, implying onstant levels of real money balanes together with onstant alloa-
tions.
Denition 5.1 An orbit {(Mt, pt)}
∞
0 is alled a balaned path if for all t one has mt := Mt/pt =
Mt+1/pt+1 = mt+1.
It is lear that balaned paths an be identied with half-lines in the state spae R
2
+. Exploiting
the homogeneity of the two mappings desribing the money dynamis and the prie dynamis,
(54) indues a one-dimensional system desribing the dynamis of real balanes, given by
mt+1 =
Mt+1
pt+1
=
M(Mt, p
e
t,t+1, λ)
ψ∗
(
M(Mt, pet,t+1, λ), p
e
t,t+1, λ
)
=
pt
(
Mt
pt
+ g − τ˜
(
ψ∗(Mt,pt,λ)
pt
, λ
)
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))
ptAS−1
(
D
(
Mt
pt
, λ
))
=
mt + g − τ˜ (ψ
∗(mt, 1, λ), λ)D(mt)
AS−1 (D(mt))
=: F(mt).
(55)
For the isoelasti example, one obtains an expliit isoelasti form of the time-one map
F(mt) =
mt + g − τ˜ (ψ
∗(mt, 1, λ), λ)D(mt)
AS−1(D(mt))
=
mt + g − τ˜ (1, λ)D(mt)
AS−1(1)(D(mt))
BC−(C+1)
BC
=
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)− τ˜ (1, λ)
AS−1(1)
(D(mt))
C+1
BC
=
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)− τ˜ (1, λ)
AS−1(1)
(
1− c(1− τπ)(1− λ)(1−
BC
C+1
)
)C+1
BC
(mt + g)
C+1
BC .
Positive xed points of (55) are assoiated with positive balaned paths of (54). It is straight-
forward to show that F(mt) is stritly inreasing and stritly onvex for all mt whih exludes
20
Note that τ˜ (1, λ) depends on BC
C+1 , too!
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(a) role of publi onsumption: 0 < g1 < g2 < g3
PSfrag replaements
0
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(b) onvergene/divergene
Figure 17: Existene, uniqueness, and stability
yles. In addition, for the isoelasti example, F is isoelasti in mt+g. Moreover, for g = 0 one
has F(0) = 0, and government onsumption g > 0 indues a horizontal shift of the mapping.
Therefore, there exists a ritial level g∗ > 0 suh that F has no xed points for g > g∗, exatly
one xed point for g = g∗, and two positive xed points for 0 < g < g∗. The left panel of
Figure 17 depits these three dierent situations.
21
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(a) stationary real money balanes
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(b) stationary rates of ination
Figure 18: Stationary states for parameters as in Table 2
Sine the rate of ination at a xed point m is a stritly monotonially dereasing funtion in
real money holdings AS−1(D(m)), the lower xed point orresponds to a higher rate of ination
21
Sine the average tax rate τ˜ has no expetations eet, these ndings orrespond one-to-one to the om-
petitive ase analyzed in Böhm (2010), whih ontains a proof of these results.
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than the upper one. Therefore, if g → 0, real money balanes at the lower xed point tend
to zero, whih implies that the equilibrium rate of ination tends to innity. However, it is
possible that the unstable xed point indues ination as well as the stable xed point ould
indue deation (see Figure 18).
Applying the elastiity rules to F evaluated at a xed point m yields
F ′(m) = EF (m) =
C + 1
BC
m
m+ g
whih is similar to ν1 in the two-dimensional ase. This shows that the derivative (i. e. the
eigenvalue of the one-dimensional system) is bounded from above by
C+1
BC
, whih an be arbi-
trarily large. Therefore, if two xed points exist, by onvexity and monotoniity, the lower one
PSfrag replaements
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Figure 19: Balaned paths and the role of government onsumption
is asymptotially stable with the basin of attration being the half-open interval between zero
(inluded) and the upper xed point (exluded). Figure 19 displays the set of steady states in
(g,m)-spae with their assoiated stability/instability properties.
5.5 Stable Balaned Paths
It is well-known from models of eonomi growth that stability and onvergene of the ratio
of two variables is only a neessary ondition for onvergene to a balaned path in the two-
dimensional state spae. In other words, stability in real money balanes does not imply
onvergene to the balaned path.
22
Let ∆t := Mt − mpt = (mt − m)pt denote the distane
from the balaned path m for any t. Convergene to the balaned path then implies that this
distane onverges to zero in addition to limt→∞mt = m. Suh a weaker notion of stability
in the two-dimensional state spae allows for ination resp. deation (and thus an unbalaned
governmental budget) when there exists a ray or half-line through the origin to whih the
system (54) onverges.
22
see Deardor (1970); Böhm (2009); Böhm, Pampel & Wenzelburger (2005); Pampel (2009)
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Denition 5.2 (Stable balaned paths) Let m = M ′t/p
′
t > 0 denote the level of real money
balanes assoiated with a balaned path {(M ′t , p
′
t)}
∞
t=0 . An orbit {(Mt, pt)}
∞
t=0 of the dynamial
system (54) is said to onverge to the balaned path m if ∆t = Mt−mpt = (mt−m)pt onverges
to zero for t→∞.
PSfrag repla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(a) two unstable paths; Table 1, g ≈ 0.9854
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(b) one stable, one unstable path; Table 2, g ≈ 0.21
Figure 20: Stability of balaned paths in state spae
Sine, for any balaned path m > 0, one has
∆t+1 = (mt+1 −m)pt+1 =
mt+1 −m
mt −m
pt+1
pt
(mt −m)pt =
mt+1 −m
mt −m
pt+1
pt
∆t,
and sine pt+1/pt = AS
−1(D(mt)), the dynamial system (54) indues the two-dimensional
dynamial system
(
mt+1
∆t+1
)
=

 F(mt)
F(mt)−m
mt−m
AS−1(D(mt))∆t

 . (56)
Let (m, 0) be a xed point of the system (56). The eigenvalues evaluated at (m, 0) are
∂mt+1
∂mt
(m, 0) = F ′(m) and
∂∆t+1
∂∆t
(m, 0) = F ′(m)AS−1(D(m)).
Sine the upper balaned path has F ′(m) > 1, it an never be attrating. For the lower
balaned path, one has F ′(m) < 1 so that stability ours whenever F ′(m)AS−1(D(m)) < 1.
Thus, (m, 0) is asymptotially stable for (56) if one an nd values of the parameters suh that
F ′(m)AS−1(D(m)) < 1. Under the parameterization of Table 2, the stable ase ours while
the unstable ase is assoiated with the parameterization of Table 1. The results of a numerial
analysis of onvergene/divergene (with levels of g hosen slightly below the ritial level g∗)
are given in Figure 20 and Figure 21.
Figure 20 displays several paths under the two dierent parameterizations. Panel (a) indiates
that both balaned paths are unstable under the standard parameterization with g ≈ 0.9854.
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(a) two unstable paths; Table 1, g ≈ 0.9854
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Figure 21: Stability of balaned paths in (∆, m)-spae
In ontrast, panel (b) shows that for the parametrization given in Table 2 with g ≈ 0.2100,
all paths with initial real money holdings below the level of the unstable steady state of (55)
onverge to a path with slope stable state of (55). With eah path in Figure 20, there is an
assoiated path in Figure 21, showing that in panel (a) the lower steady state is a saddle while
it is a sink in panel (b).
6 Summary and Conlusion
There are two main questions whih were investigated in this paper. The rst one dealt with the
alloative onsequenes of eient bargaining arrangements between a union and a produer
assoiation on the wage rate and on employment as well as on the temporary equilibrium of
a mareonomy as ompared with the ompetitive or other nonompetitive equilibria. It was
shown that, ontrary to ommon beliefs and results from partial-equilibriummodels, an eient
bargaining solution in the labor market ombined with a ompetitive output market indues
strong ross-market eets within the maroeonomy whih oset the eieny feature built
into the onept at given market pries. In other words, ontrary to ommon understanding
and to eonomi folklore derived from partial-equilibrium models, eient bargaining between
a union and produers in the labor market does not generate the desired eieny expeted for
the maroeonomy as a whole. Moreover, it was shown that eonomi ativity, i. e. output and
employment, delines with an inrease of union power. Thus, high bargaining power leads to
low employment and low output in temporary equilibrium at all states, and it may even lead
to low wages in ertain ases. Thus, a high relative inome distribution of wages to prots by a
strong union omes at the ost of low real eonomi ativity. Therefore, from a general welfare
point of view too muh union power may not be desirable.
A omparison of the bargaining outomes with other one-sided strategi equilibria showed that
payos under bargaining are often stritly dominated by the one-sided monopolisti equilibria
whih are ineient. Thus, the prie feedbak through the ommodity market operates strongly
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in support of monopolisti behavior, favoring the payos of the respetive monopolist.
For the seond major objetive investigating the dynamis of the eonomy under perfet fore-
sight, it was shown that struturally a maroeonomy with eient bargaining and onstant
union power behaves in the same way dynamially as under ompetition in both markets.
Existene and stability of balaned states were shown to depend in the same way on the gov-
ernment parameters and the onsequenes implied by the budget deit. For the parametri
example with isoelasti funtions in both setors, it was shown that the stability onditions
are ompletely determined by the elastiities in both setors and by union power. In this ase,
all orbits are monotoni, and underemployment or overemployment levels are onstant. These
results imply also that extension to situations with stohasti shoks in prodution or demand
do not hange the general onlusion that the properties of rational-expetations equilibria are
struturally idential to those of perfet ompetition.
Finally, it should be noted that the two main underlying assumptions ould be ontested on
several grounds. The assumption of a given onstant bargaining power at all times may be
questioned sine it has no miroeonomi justiation. It would be desirable to formulate a
proess whih determines the bargaining power endogenously, for example in response to the
levels of underemployment or overemployment during the dynami evolution. A seond mod-
iation would be of removing the full-eieny requirement in the bargaining proess to one
where negotiations are only over wages while the employment levels are determined through the
market. This would introdue the right-to-manage priniple into the maroeonomy, bringing
the model loser to empirially observed negotiations and mehanisms. For both extensions,
it would be again more reasonable to examine dynami adjustments of the measure of union
power, inreasing the potential for interesting employment and output yles and tradeos.
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